US Officials Exclude Car Bombs in Touting Drop in Iraq Violence

By Nancy A. Youssef McClatchy Newspapers Thursday 26 April 2007

Washington - U.S. officials who say there has been a dramatic drop in sectarian violence in Iraq since President Bush began sending more American troops into Baghdad aren't counting one of the main killers of Iraqi civilians.

Car bombs and other explosive devices have killed thousands of Iraqis in the past three years, but the administration doesn't include them in the casualty counts it has been citing as evidence that the surge of additional U.S. forces is beginning to defuse tensions between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

President Bush explained why in a television interview on Tuesday. "If the standard of success is no car bombings or suicide bombings, we have just handed those who commit suicide bombings a huge victory," he told TV interviewer Charlie Rose.

Others, however, say that not counting bombing victims skews the evidence of how well the Baghdad security plan is protecting the civilian population - one of the surge's main goals.

"Since the administration keeps saying that failure is not an option, they are redefining success in a way that suits them," said James Denselow, an Iraq specialist at London-based Chatham House, a foreign policy think tank.

Bush administration officials have pointed to a dramatic decline in one category of deaths - the bodies dumped daily in Baghdad streets, which officials call sectarian murders - as evidence that the security plan is working. Bush said this week that that number had declined by 50 percent, a number confirmed by statistics compiled by McClatchy Newspapers.

But the number of people killed in explosive attacks is rising, the same statistics show - up from 323 in March, the first full month of the security plan, to 365 through April 24.

Overall, statistics indicate that the number of violent deaths has declined significantly since December, when 1,391 people died in Baghdad, either executed and found dead on the street or killed by bomb blasts. That number was 796 in March and 691 through April 24.

Nearly all of that decline, however, can be attributed to a drop in executions, most of which were blamed on Shiite Muslim militias aligned with the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Much of the decline occurred before the security plan began on Feb. 15, and since then radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has ordered his Mahdi Army militia to stand down.

According to the statistics, which McClatchy reporters in Baghdad compile daily from Iraqi police reports, 1,030 bodies were found in December. In January, that number declined 32 percent, to 699. It declined to 596 February and again to 473 in March.

Deaths from car bombings and improvised explosive devices, however, increased from 361 in December to a peak of 520 in February before dropping to 323 in March.

In that same period, the number of bombings has increased, as well. In December, there were 65 explosive attacks. That number was unchanged in January, but it rose to 72 in February, 74 in March and 81 through April 24.

U.S. officials blame the bombings largely on al-Qaida, which they say is hoping to provoke sectarian conflict by targeting Shiite neighborhoods with massive explosions.

Ryan Crocker, who became the U.S. ambassador in Iraq this month, said the bombings are a reaction to the surge of additional U.S. troops into Baghdad.

"The terrorists like al-Qaida would make their own surge," Crocker said this week.

U.S. officials have said that they don't expect the security plan to stop bombings.

"I don't think you're ever going to get rid of all the car bombs," Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said this week. "Iraq is going to have to learn as did, say, Northern Ireland, to live with some degree of sensational attacks."

But some think that approach could backfire, with Iraqis eventually blaming the Americans for failing to stop bombings.

"To win, the insurgents just have to prove they are not losing," said Denselow, of London's Chatham House.

Experts who have studied car bombings say it's no surprise that U.S. officials would want to exclude their victims from any measure of success.

Car bombs are almost impossible to detect and stop, particularly in a traffic-jammed city such as Baghdad. U.S. officials in Baghdad concede that while they've found scores of car bomb factories in Iraq, they've made only a small dent in the manufacturing of these weapons.

Mike Davis, who recently wrote a history of car bombs, said that once car bombs are introduced into a conflict, they're all but impossible to eradicate. A few people with rudimentary skills can assemble one with massive effect.

"They really don't have to be very sophisticated; they just have to be very big," Davis said.

Davis said checkpoints are useful in detecting car bombs "until they blow up the checkpoint," and erecting walls is not practically feasible in communities. When U.S. officials proposed building walls around Baghdad's most troubled neighborhoods to fend off car bomb attacks, residents balked, saying the walls would further divide the city along sectarian lines.

Bombers also have shown that they can adapt quickly. When the U.S. military blocked off markets to vehicular traffic, bombers wearing explosive vests were able to walk into the areas.

Finding a defense against car bombs has fallen to the Joint IED Defeat Organization, a Pentagon task force created in 2003 to find ways to protect U.S. troops from roadside bombs, which remain the No. 1 killer of Americans in Iraq.

But car bombs aren't the primary killer of American service members, said Christine Devries, the task force's spokeswoman. Roadside bombs are.

About Iraqi Civilian Casualties

There are no authoritative statistics on Iraqi civilian casualties. The Iraq Study Group in its report last year found that the Pentagon routinely underreports violence. Other groups have criticized the Iraqi government's statistics as unreliable - a moot point since the government recently stopped releasing comprehensive totals. On Wednesday, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq chastised the Iraqi government for withholding statistics on sectarian violence.

One study, conducted by Johns Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health and Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad, estimated that 78,000 Iraqis were killed by car bombings between March 2003 and June 2006.

Iraq Body Count, which keeps statistics based on news reports, finds that there have been just over 1,050 car bombs that have killed more than one person since August 2003, when a car bomb detonated in front of what was the United Nations headquarters, killing 17.

McClatchy gathers its statistics daily from police contacts, and while they're not comprehensive, they're collected the same way every day.

A roundup of Iraq violence is posted daily on the McClatchy Washington Bureau Web site, http://www.mcclatchydc.com.

Democratic Candidates Gang Up on Bush, War in Iraq

By Steven Thomma McClatchy Newspapers Friday 27 April 2007

Orangeburg, SC - Candidates for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination eyed each other politely - even warily - Thursday in their first face-to-face debate, a session that offered little likelihood of dramatically shaking up the young campaign.

The eight candidates differed sharply with President Bush, particularly on Iraq, but seldom with one another. The format did not allow them to directly challenge each other - and few did.

Rather, they mostly agreed in their desire to get U.S. troops out of Iraq, to expand health care to the uninsured while controlling costs for those with insurance, to support abortion rights without qualification, and to bar access to guns for the mentally ill like the gunman who killed 32 at Virginia Tech.

Absent direct challenges - or any pronounced gaffes - the debate probably did nothing to fundamentally change the shape of the contest with Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois and former Sen. John Edwards of North Carolina leading in the polls and the rest trailing well behind.

Campaign aides said afterward that they saw little in the debate that would dramatically alter the political landscape - though each predictably said that his or her own candidate did very well.

Mark Penn, senior strategist to the Clinton campaign, said it was too early to expect direct attacks that would turn off voters just getting to know the candidates. "Now is not the time for sharp exchanges," he said.

The debate was the first of a fast-developing campaign in a party desperate to pick a winner who can retake the White House from the Republicans in November 2008 - an eagerness underscored by the thousands who have gathered for unusually early rallies, and the tens of thousands writing checks to finance campaigns.

Sponsored by the South Carolina Democratic Party, the 90-minute debate was moderated by NBC newsman Brian Williams on the campus of South Carolina State University.

Iraq dominated the early questioning, coming just hours after the Senate voted to mandate the withdrawal of U.S. troops starting in October. All four sitting senators running for the nomination voted for the ordered withdrawal.

All candidates said they supported troop removal. Obama stressed that he was proud to have opposed the war from the start when he was a state senator.

Two candidates refused to say whether they agreed with the recent assertion by Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., the Senate majority leader, that the Iraq war is "lost."

Clinton sidestepped the issue but said she was "proud" of Reid's leadership. Sen. Joe Biden of Delaware also refused to comment on Reid's assertion. "This is not a game show," he said.

Despite their opposition to the war, none of the candidates would join fellow candidate Rep. Dennis Kucinich of Ohio in urging impeachment of Vice President Dick Cheney.

On health care, all propose finding ways to cover the nation's 47 million uninsured while controlling costs. They differed on the need to raise taxes to pay for their proposals.

Edwards said he would raise taxes on those making more than $200,000 to finance his proposed coverage of the uninsured. Clinton said she would not add any new spending - presumably meaning she would not add new taxes. Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico flatly ruled out raising taxes.

Several candidates including Biden, Clinton and Richardson also said they want to curb access to guns by the mentally ill in the wake of the Virginia Tech massacre.

But Richardson cautioned against going too far to regulate guns. "I'm a Westerner," he said. "The Second Amendment is precious in the West."

Richardson and four others - Sen. Chris Dodd of Connecticut, former Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska, Biden and Kucinich - raised their hands when asked if they had ever had a gun in their home.

Pressed to explain why he used campaign money to pay for a $400 haircut, Edwards called it a mistake.

Edwards and Clinton both were asked to explain how hedge funds improve the country - Edwards because he worked for one, Clinton because she represents the state where many are based.

Edwards said hedge funds are "an important part" of figuring out how to expand health care or solve poverty, though he didn't explain how. Clinton said the country is better because of its "entrepreneurial economy" but added that government regulation ensures that none has an "unfair advantage."

There were a couple of light spots in the evening.

One came from little-known Gravel when he was asked to explain his presence in the campaign and the debate. "Some of these people frighten me," said Gravel to laughter.

The other moment belonged to Biden. Asked by Williams whether he could control his exceedingly verbose style on the world stage, Biden gave a one-word answer: "Yes."

Army Officer Accuses Generals of "Intellectual and Moral Failures"

By Thomas E. Ricks The Washington Post Friday 27 April 2007

An active-duty Army officer is publishing a blistering attack on U.S. generals, saying they have botched the war in Iraq and misled Congress about the situation there.

"America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq," charges Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq veteran who is deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. "The intellectual and moral failures . . . constitute a crisis in American generals."

Yingling's comments are especially striking because his unit's performance in securing the northwestern Iraqi city of Tall Afar was cited by President Bush in a March 2006 speech and provided the model for the new security plan underway in Baghdad.

He also holds a high profile for a lieutenant colonel: He attended the Army's elite School for Advanced Military Studies and has written for one of the Army's top professional journals, Military Review.

The article, "General Failure," is to be published today in Armed Forces Journal and is posted at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/. Its appearance signals the public emergence of a split inside the military between younger, mid-career officers and the top brass.

Many majors and lieutenant colonels have privately expressed anger and frustration with the performance of Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and other top commanders in the war, calling them slow to grasp the realities of the war and overly optimistic in their assessments.

Some younger officers have stated privately that more generals should have been taken to task for their handling of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, news of which broke in 2004. The young officers also note that the Army's elaborate "lessons learned" process does not criticize generals and that no generals in Iraq have been replaced for poor battlefield performance, a contrast to other U.S. wars.

Top Army officials are also worried by the number of captains and majors choosing to leave the service. "We do have attrition in those grade slots above our average," acting Army Secretary Pete Geren noted in congressional testimony this week. In order to curtail the number of captains leaving, he said, the Army is planning a $20,000 bonus for those who agree to stay in, plus choices of where to be posted and other incentives.

Until now, charges of incompetent leadership have not been made as publicly by an Army officer as Yingling does in his article.

"After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public," he writes. "For reasons that are not yet clear, America's general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq."

Yingling said he decided to write the article after attending Purple Heart and deployment ceremonies for Army soldiers. "I find it hard to look them in the eye," he said in an interview. "Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers."

He said he had made his superiors aware of the article but had not sought permission to publish it. He intends to stay in the Army, he said, noting that he is scheduled in two months to take command of a battalion at Fort Hood, Tex.

The article has been read by about 30 of his peers, Yingling added. "At the level of lieutenant colonel and below, it received almost universal approval," he said.
Retired Marine Col. Jerry Durrant, now working in Iraq as a civilian contractor, agrees that discontent is widespread. "Talk to the junior leaders in the services and ask what they think of their senior leadership, and many will tell you how unhappy they are," he said.

Yingling advocates overhauling the way generals are picked and calls for more involvement by Congress. To replace today's "mild-mannered team players," he writes, Congress should create incentives in the promotion system to "reward adaptation and intellectual achievement."

He does not criticize officers by name; instead, the article refers repeatedly to "America's generals." Yingling said he did this intentionally, in order to focus not on the failings of a few people but rather on systemic problems.

He also recommends that Congress review the performance of senior generals as they retire and exercise its power to retire them at a lower rank if it deems their performance inferior. The threat of such high-profile demotions would restore accountability among top officers, he contends. "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war," he states.

Dying for W

By Robert Parry Consortium News Thursday 26 April 2007

George W. Bush admits he has no evidence that a withdrawal timetable from Iraq would be harmful. Instead, the President told interviewer Charlie Rose that this core assumption behind his veto threat of a Democratic war appropriation bill is backed by "just logic."

"I mean, you say we start moving troops out," Bush said in the interview on April 24. "Don't you think an enemy is going to wait and adjust based upon an announced timetable for withdrawal?"

It is an argument that Bush has made again and again over the past few years, that with a withdrawal timetable, the "enemy" would just "wait us out." But the answer to Bush's rhetorical question could be, "well, so what if they do?"

If Bush is right and a withdrawal timetable quiets Iraq down for the next year or so - a kind of de facto cease-fire - that could buy time for the Iraqis to begin the difficult process of reconciliation and start removing the irritants that have enflamed the violence.

One of those irritants has been the impression held by many Iraqi nationalists that Bush and his neoconservative advisers want to turn Iraq into a permanent colony while using its territory as a land-based aircraft carrier to pressure or attack other Muslim nations.

The neocons haven't helped by referring to Bush's 2003 conquest as the "USS Iraq" and joking about whether next to force "regime change" in Syria or Iran, with the punch-line, "Real men go to Tehran."

By refusing to set an end date for the U.S. military occupation, Bush has fed this suspicion, prompting many Iraqis - both Sunni and Shiite - to attack American troops. Another negative consequence has been that the drawn-out Iraq War has bought time for foreign al-Qaeda terrorists to put down roots with Sunni insurgents.

Obviously, there is no guarantee that a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal would bring peace to Iraq. The greater likelihood remains that civil strife will continue for some years to come as Iraq's factions nurse their grievances and push for a new national equilibrium.

But the counterpoint to Bush's veto threat against a withdrawal timetable is that his open-ended war is doomed to failure. To attain even the appearance of limited success would require American forces to effectively exterminate all Iraqis who are part of the armed resistance to the U.S. occupation.

After all, the only logical reason for not wanting the "enemy" to lie low is so American troops can capture or kill them.

That has been Bush's strategy for the past four-plus years - longer than it took the United States to win World War II - and the military situation has only grown increasingly dire. Meanwhile, anti-Americanism has swelled around the world, especially among Muslims.

Failed Surge

But a long, bloody stalemate is the likely result from Bush's stubbornness. With little fanfare, the Bush administration has essentially abandoned its earlier "exit strategy" of training a new Iraqi army so as "they stand up, we'll stand down."

Bush's much-touted "surge" - beefing up American forces in Baghdad and other hot spots - is an indirect acknowledgement that the training was a flop. The "surge" is a do-over of the war's original approach of relying on American troops to bring security to the country.

The "surge" also places American troops in lightly defended outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods, rather than concentrating U.S. forces in high-security barracks. The Pentagon acknowledges that this approach will put Americans in greater danger, both from insurgents and from Iraqi police whose loyalties are suspect.

The prediction of higher U.S. casualties is already coming true, as al-Qaeda-connected terrorists and Iraqi insurgents adjust their tactics to kill the vulnerable Americans. On April 23, two suicide truck bombers rammed a U.S. Army outpost near Baqubah, exploding two bombs that killed nine American soldiers and wounded 20 others.

As Iraq's temperatures begin to soar into the 100s, the American troops will have to fight the heat as well as the insurgents. The secure base camps were well equipped with air conditioning, water and other supplies that won't be as accessible in the remote outposts scattered throughout hostile neighborhoods.

Supplying these American troops will be another invitation for ambushes and roadside bombs.

The chances that U.S. troops will kill Iraqi civilians will rise, too, as may have happened earlier this month when an American helicopter gunship killed an Iraqi mother and her two sons in Baghdad Al-Amel neighborhood. [Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 2007]

Bush's insistence on an open-ended U.S. occupation also plays into the hands of foreign al-Qaeda terrorists who are estimated to number only about five percent of the armed opposition.

Captured al-Qaeda documents reveal that the terrorist group has had trouble building alliances with Iraqi insurgents. So, al-Qaeda has pinned its hopes on keeping the U.S. military bogged down in Iraq indefinitely while those bridges are built and a new generation of extremists is recruited, trained and hardened.

In addition, having the U.S. military focused on Iraq protects Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders holed up on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

An announced date for American withdrawal would put non-Iraqi al-Qaeda operatives in a tighter fix. Without the indefinite U.S. occupation, al-Qaeda would find it tougher to recruit young jihadists and would likely face military pressure from Iraqi nationalists fed up with foreign interference of all kinds.

That is why al-Qaeda leaders view Bush's open-ended war in Iraq as crucial to their long-range plans for spreading their radical ideology throughout the Muslim world. As "Atiyah," one of bin Laden's top lieutenants, explained in a Dec. 11, 2005, letter, "prolonging the war is in our interest."

[To read the "prolonging the war" passage from the captured Atiyah letter at the Web site of West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, click here and then scroll down to the bottom of page 16 and the top of page 17.]

"False Hope"

Military and intelligence analysts have told me that the "surge" is already recognized as a failure by U.S. military officers stationed in Iraq. "It's just another layer on top of what they've already been doing," one well-placed U.S. military source said.

In this view, the "surge" is more a political tactic than a military one, a way for Bush to argue for more money without strings, one more time. Presumably, after the "surge" collapses in obvious failure, Bush and his advisers will point to another mirage on the horizon.

Or, as comedian Lewis Black has put it, "Keep false hope alive."

Given what the Iraq Study Group has called the "grave and deteriorating" conditions in Iraq, why not give a timetable for American withdrawal a chance? It potentially could help achieve three goals:

First, it might tamp down the violence from Iraqi nationalists who, if Bush's "logic" is right, would lie low for a while. Second, it might pressure the Iraqi government to get serious about reconciliation during a respite from the violence. Third, it might help isolate al-Qaeda and deny the terrorist group the recruiting advantage from the open-ended U.S. occupation.

There also would be an incentive for the Iraqi nationalists to cooperate in reconciliation, because the United States could reverse its withdrawal plans if Iraq descended into chaos as a failed state or became a haven for al-Qaeda. At minimum, an announced U.S. withdrawal would change the current depressing political and military dynamic in Iraq.

So, a Bush victory in the funding showdown with congressional Democrats might lead to some high-fiving at the White House and mean that President Bush will have saved some political face. But the prospect of an open-ended war will condemn Iraqis and American soldiers alike to nightmarish months ahead and the certainty of many more deaths.

In effect, they will be asked to die for W.

Chairman Murtha to Bush: Sign the Iraq Accountability Act

Press Release Thursday 26 April 2007

Washington, D.C. - Congressman John P. Murtha, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, issued the following statement Wednesday on the House passage of the Iraq Accountability Act conference report:

"For over four years, the President has been waging a war without end and a war without accountability and oversight. No longer will this Congress and the American People continue to give the President a blank check in order to continue a failed policy.

"Accountability is desperately needed, and this bill is called the Iraq Accountability Act for a good reason. It requires accountability on the part of the Iraqi Government to solve its own civil war. It calls for the President to be accountable for our military readiness and the welfare of our troops and to begin a responsible redeployment of our forces from Iraq.

"The Iraq Accountability Act provides four billion dollars more than the President requested for the military. This includes additional funding to address training and equipment shortfalls, additional funding for defense health care, and additional funding for PTSD counseling and Traumatic Brain Injury research.

"If the President vetoes the Iraq Accountability Act, he is denying our troops the resources that they need; he is denying our veterans the medical care they deserve; and he is denying the American People a new direction for Iraq. I strongly urge the President, whose own Generals have said that this war cannot be won militarily, to listen to the American People and sign the Iraq Accountability Act."

Senate Passes Iraq War Bill Requiring Pullout

By Carl Hulse and Jeff Zeleny The New York Times Thursday 26 April 2007

Washington - The Senate narrowly passed a $124 billion war spending bill early this afternoon after an emotional debate about the best way forward in Iraq. The vote will send the measure to President Bush, who has vowed to veto it because it would require American troops to begin withdrawing by Oct. 1.

The 51-46 vote, far short of the two-thirds majority that would be needed to override Mr. Bush's veto, came after a morning-long debate in which supporters of the bill called it a way to make the Iraqis take responsibility for their own security, while opponents called it a blueprint for defeat.

But the outcome was regarded as certain all along, with the White House saying the president might not even comment on it today, given the absence of suspense.

Still, there was plenty of feeling in evidence in the Senate as it debated the bill, which the House of Representatives narrowly approved on Wednesday.

Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic majority leader, called the bill one that "we can and will proudly send to the president," and one that charts a new course in Iraq while honoring America's fighting forces.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, said the measure is "the only way to make Iraqis take responsibility" for their own destiny. Mr. Kennedy said the president has been wrong all along on Iraq. "Now, he is wrong to threaten to veto this bill," the senator said. "We cannot repeat the mistake of Vietnam."

Another Democratic supporter, Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, said the conflict is "a war that never should have started, and on this president's watch may never end" without a timetable for American withdrawal.

But Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, an independent who lost the Democratic nomination last year at least partly because of his support for the war, called the bill "a deadline for defeat" and said it would have "exactly the opposite effect that its supporters expect" because it would discourage the Iraqis.

And Senator James M. Inhofe, Republican of Oklahoma, said it was high time to "look beyond the politics of this thing, and do the right thing" by letting Gen. David H. Petraeus, the American commander in Iraq, a chance to finish the job.

General Petraeus himself acknowledged this morning that the situation in Iraq is "exceedingly complex and very tough."

"Success will take continued commitment, perseverance and sacrifice, all to make possible an opportunity for the all-important Iraqi political actions that are the key to long-term solutions to Iraq's many problems," the general said at a Pentagon briefing.

At the White House, meanwhile, a spokeswoman for the president, Dana Perino, said that Mr. Bush would veto the measure "very soon," so that "we can take the next step." The next step, presumably, would be more back-and-forth between the White House and the Capitol, since backers of the bill have nowhere near the two-thirds majority required in each chamber to override a veto.

Asked if Mr. Bush planned to comment, Ms. Perino said, "Look, this is a little bit of a foregone conclusion, a little bit anti-climactic," she said.

The veto will be the second of Mr. Bush's presidency, and the first since Democrats gained control of Congress. Last year, Mr. Bush vetoed a stem-cell research bill.

On Wednesday, only hours after General Petraeus told lawmakers he needed more time to gauge the effectiveness of the recent troop buildup there, the House approved the measure by 218 to 208."Last fall, the American people voted for a new direction in Iraq," said Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Democrat of California. "They made it clear that our troops must be given all they need to do their jobs, but that our troops must be brought home responsibly, safely, and soon."

Republicans accused Democrats of establishing a "date certain" for America's defeat in Iraq and capitulating to terrorism.

"This bill is nothing short of a cut and run in the fight against Al Qaeda," said Representative Harold Rogers, Republican of Kentucky.

On the final vote, 216 Democrats and 2 Republicans supported the bill; 195 Republicans and 13 Democrats opposed it. The legislation provides more than $95 billion for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through Sept. 30, with the money conditioned on the administration's willingness to accept a timetable for withdrawal and new benchmarks to assess the progress of the Iraqi government.

Democratic leaders plan to send the bill to the White House early next week - coinciding with the fourth anniversary of Mr. Bush's May 1, 2003, speech aboard an aircraft carrier, when he declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq, under a banner that said "Mission Accomplished."

With the outcome essentially preordained, advocacy groups on both sides of the issue were readying campaigns to try to shape public opinion as the showdown unfolds.

Groups aligned with the Democrats plan to capitalize on the connection between the veto and the "mission accomplished" anniversary. Americans United for Change has produced a television commercial that replays scenes of Mr. Bush on the carrier and says: "He was wrong then. And he's wrong now. It's the will of one nation versus the stubbornness of one man."

Allies of the president are mobilizing as well. The conservative Web site Townhall.com was organizing an online "no surrender" petition, and urging visitors to the site to tell the Democratic Party's "rogues' gallery that we will not stand for their defeatism," adding, "While they may lack courage, our troops do not and they deserve the resources needed to win this war."

With the vote barely behind them, House Democrats were already considering how to respond legislatively to Mr. Bush's veto. Though there are differing ideas, Representative John P. Murtha of Pennsylvania, a Democrat who oversees defense appropriations, said his preference would be to "robustly fund the troops for two months," and include benchmarks but no timetable for withdrawal.

In addition to General Petraeus, lawmakers in the House and Senate heard on Wednesday from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As they walked into the House briefing, the officials were greeted by about a dozen war protesters, some of whom shouted: "War criminal! War criminal!" One woman walked alongside the general, urging him in a softer tone to consider her point of view.

After the briefing, whose substance was classified, Representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, the majority leader, disputed criticisms that Democrats were trying to end the war before giving the administration's plan a chance to succeed.

"Nobody is saying, 'Get out tomorrow,' " Mr. Hoyer said, noting that the legislation would allow American troops to remain in Iraq to battle terrorist groups.

He and Representative John A. Boehner of Ohio, the Republican leader, differed on what emerged from the briefing as the most significant cause of violence in Iraq. Mr. Hoyer attributed it to sectarian strife, while Mr. Boehner cited Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, calling the group "the major foe that we face in Iraq today."

Democrats sought to portray their approach as reasonable and called for Mr. Bush to reconsider before sending the bill back to Congress.

"I believe that this legislation, if people were to just take their time and read it, is the exit strategy that the president ought to be pleased to receive," said Representative James E. Clyburn of South Carolina, the Democratic whip.

But Republicans called it a dubious attempt at micromanaging the war and said Democrats were also seizing the opportunity to stuff the bill with home-state spending.

The president's allies, aware of public dissatisfaction with the war, acknowledged the difficulties on the ground in Iraq while portraying the Democratic approach as a prescription for defeat.

"It's been ugly, it's been difficult, it has been very painful," said Representative David Dreier, Republican of California. "We all feel the toll that has been taken and are fully aware of the price we are paying, especially in a human sense. But we do not honor those who have sacrificed by abandoning the mission."

The House vote on Wednesday and the preceding debate closely resembled those of one month ago, when the House passed its initial version 218 to 212.

UN: Baghdad Security Operation Has Failed

The Irish Examiner UK Wednesday 25 April 2007

Sectarian violence continued to claim the lives of a large number of Iraqi civilians in Sunni Arab and Shiite neighbourhoods of Iraq's capital, despite the coalition's new Baghdad security plan, the UN said today.

In its first human rights report since the security plan was launched on February 14 – and began increasing US and Iraqi troops levels in the capital - the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) said civilian casualties in the daily violence between January and March remained high, concentrated in and around Baghdad.

American troops are facing increasing danger as they step up their presence in outposts and police stations in Baghdad and areas surrounding the city, as part of the security crackdown to which US President George Bush has committed an extra 30,000 troops.

Thousands of Iraqi soldiers are also being deployed in the streets of the capital in an attempt to pacify it.

"While government officials claimed an initial drop in the number of killings in the latter half of February following the launch of the Baghdad security plan, the number of reported casualties rose again in March," the study said.

But UNAMI also said that for the first time since it began issuing quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Iraq, the new January 1-March 31 one did not contain overall mortality figures from Iraq's Ministry of Health because it refused to release them.


"UNAMI emphasises again the utmost need for the Iraqi government to operate in a transparent manner, and does not accept the government's suggestion that UNAMI used the (previous) mortality figures in an inappropriate fashion," the report said.

The UN agency said that after the publication of its last human rights report about Iraq on January 16, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's office told UNAMI its mortality figures were exaggerated, "although they were in fact official figures compiled and provided by a government ministry".

The new UNAMI report said that on March 1 Iraq's Ministry of Interior announced that 1,646 civilians were killed in Iraq in February, most of them in Baghdad, but that "it is unclear on what basis these figures were compiled."

UNAMI said that even though its current report's evidence could not be numerically substantiated with government figures, it showed continued high levels of violence throughout the reporting period, including large scale indiscriminate killings and assassinations by insurgents, militias and other armed groups.

"In February and March, sectarian violence claimed the lives of large numbers of civilians, including women and children, in both Shia and Sunni neighbourhoods of Baghdad," the report said.

Four Million Displaced as Civil War Deepens Iraqi Refugee Crisis

By Deniz Yeter t r u t h o u t | Report Wednesday 25 April 2007

The unfolding civil war and inter-sectarian violence in Iraq is deepening a humanitarian crisis of refugees, a Congressional Research Service Report has found. The report, entitled "Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?" was released in March 2007.

An estimated four million refugees have been displaced, or 13 percent of the Iraqi population. About 1.2 million resulted from the previous Gulf War and a decade of US sanctions. Two million Iraqis are already believed to have fled mainly into neighboring Syria and Jordan, with an additional two million displaced within Iraq.

Since the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite Muslim Al-Askariya shrine in Samarra that marked the beginning of intense, widespread sectarian clashes, an estimated 730,000 more Iraqis are now displaced within Iraq. They are referred to as Internally Displaced Persons or IDPs. Sectarian cleansing is being employed to take control of territory from the opposing factions. That tactic once was commonly used by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, whose 30-year regime left an estimated 1.5 million Iraqis displaced.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, estimates that 40,000 to 50,000 Iraqis are displaced each month, with the numbers continuously increasing. At this rate, it's believed that an additional 2.3 to 2.7 million refugees will be displaced within Iraq by December. One group of refugees displaced inside Iran, who moved back to Iraq before the March 2003 invasion, are now displaced once again - this time inside Iraq.

Seventy percent of those fleeing are coming from Baghdad. Sunnis have moved from the south to the middle of Iraq and Shiites from the middle to the south. Kurds have moved to the northern areas of Iraq in areas like Kirkuk. When moving in with friends or family isn't an option, many of the displaced wind up squatting in schools, factories or mosques that are typically damaged or abandoned.

There are many groups, such as US or Iraqi government workers, those working with international organizations, and even Palestinians who are particularly vulnerable to reprisal attacks from various factions due to ethnic, religious, or political alignments. There are also many vulnerable groups within the displaced, such as pregnant women, children, the sick and the elderly.

As a part of the surge and Baghdad security plan, US and Iraqi forces are resettling the displaced in their previous homes. The consequences of this resettling plan are yet to be seen. The CRS report suggests a re-examination of resettlement policies and strategies for refugees, especially those displaced within Iraq, and humanitarian relief funds for refugees, including those outside Iraq.

Lack of security has dramatically impacted the standard of living. Kidnappings and assassinations have become a part of everyday life for thousands of Iraqis. Health care, education and social services have all been severely crippled due to the escalating violence, constantly limiting Iraqi society.

Threats of violence have also caused many people to not sleep at their homes or to not stick with routines, to avoid following a pattern known as nighttime and daylight displacement, that could make one a prime candidate for attacks or kidnappings.

The CRS report mentions that the humanitarian crisis is quickly outpacing others in the region, noting it's the largest level of displacement in the Middle East since 1948 with the creation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli War, which has resulted in a continuing 40-year Israeli occupation. That occupation has displaced an estimated 7 million Palestinians, according to UN statistics.

Syria, which has taken in roughly 1 million refugees, including many Iraqi Christians and Shiites, is already feeling a strain on its economy from this open borders policy. Inflation and the cost of housing are rising, and there is a looming threat of water and electrical shortages.

Tensions are high inside the country, with many Syrians complaining about refugees taking jobs that were already scarce before the increase of immigration. Syrian officials worry that the sectarian violence will spill over the border and make its way into the country.

Jordan, which took in an estimated 800,000 refugees, is feeling many of the same constraints, with a population boom of 20 percent due to refugees. While the country's banking and real estate markets are growing with the increased demand for housing, the economy is also suffering from a sharp rise in inflation.

The impact of refugees on the country has increased tensions between Jordanian citizens and the displaced. In response, Jordan established more rigid immigration laws in February 2007 in an attempt to slow the incoming movement.

Iraqi government ministries try to help the displaced, with only a few humanitarian NGOs working in the country who have to operate discreetly in communities for fear of attacks. When these parties fail, sectarian groups such as the Mahdi try to fill the gap by providing assistance and security.

Doubts are being raised about these communities and groups in Iraq and neighboring countries being able to provide for the displaced. Limited resources are creating competition for food, water, fuel, shelter, electricity and other basic items. The problems are compounded by rampant unemployment and a devastated economy.

Bush Blames the Troops

By Robert Scheer Truthdig Tuesday 24 April 2007

Blame it on the military but make it look like you're supporting the troops. That's been the convenient gambit of failed emperors throughout history as they witnessed their empires decline. Not surprisingly then, it's become the standard rhetorical trick employed by President Bush in shirking responsibility for the Iraq debacle of his making.

Ignoring the fact that we have a system of civilian control over the military, which is why he, the elected president, is designated the commander in chief, Bush hides behind the fiction that the officers in the field are calling the shots when in fact he has put them in an unwinnable situation and refuses to even consider a timetable for getting them out.

He did it again Monday, responding to the prospect that both houses of Congress seem in agreement on setting guidelines for the "progress" that the president continually proclaims is at hand. "I will strongly reject an artificial timetable [for] withdrawal and/or Washington politicians trying to tell those who wear the uniform how to do their job." This is disingenuous in the extreme, because Bush is the Washington politician who plotted this unnecessary war from the moment the 9/11 attack provided him with an excuse for regime change in a country that had nothing to do with the terrorist attack.

It was Bush who sent the troops to invade Iraq with the mission of ridding it of weapons of mass destruction, which he should have known Iraq did not have, and to end ties with al-Qaida that, the record shows, he knew never existed. And it was the Bush administration that micro-managed every aspect of the occupation to disastrous consequences ranging from the de-Baathification that isolated the Sunnis to premature elections that put Shiite theocrats in power. The economic reconstruction of Iraq has been a failure for everyone except the U.S. corporations that have ripped off U.S. taxpayers to the tune of many billions of dollars. It is only now, when all of those policies for the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq have come a cropper, that a military surge has been ordered to provide a social order for Iraq that this president's policies have destroyed.

This president has been denied nothing by Congress in the way of financial underwriting for this boondoggle, yet he seeks to cast even the mildest attempt to hold him accountable for the results as unpatriotic. That is all that the Democratic congressional leadership has proposed with its timetable - marks to measure progress on the ground in a war that, as Hawaii Sen. Daniel Inouye pointed out, has lasted longer than World War II. It is a very limited, nonbinding attempt to hold the president accountable, for it does not ban him from using any portion of the whopping $124 billion in new funds; it requires only that he publicly and specifically defend his claims of progress.

It's a claim of progress that, until now, has not been met with any congressional review, even though it is the obligation of Congress to judge the effectiveness of programs paid for with the funds that Congress alone can appropriate. If the proposed timetable were in place, then it would be more difficult for the president to claim success for his surge, as he did Friday, insisting that "So far, the operation is meeting expectations" and then confusing his audience by conceding that recently "We have seen some of the highest casualty levels of the war."

It's gobbledygook, and the Democratic leaders of Congress have finally decided to call the president on it. "The longer we continue down the president's path, the further we will be from responsibly ending this war," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. Not content any longer to take Bush at his word, the leaders in both the House and Senate finally posted some specific benchmarks of progress, accompanied by a nonbinding suggestion of an end to U.S. troop involvement in this quagmire within a year's time if genuine progress is not made. Even that minimum restraint on the president's ambition was accompanied with the caveat that sufficient troops would remain in Iraq to protect U.S. installations, train the Iraqi army and fight terrorists.

The proposal was the softest the Democrats could offer without totally repudiating the will of the voters who brought them to power in the last election. If the president vetoes this authorization bill, then the onus is on him for delaying funding for the troops and showing contempt for the judgment of the voters, who will have another chance in less than two years to hold the president's party responsible. But that will not restore life to the 85 U.S. soldiers killed so far in April alone, or prevent even greater sacrifices to Bush's folly.

The Lost War

By Serge Truffaut Le Devoir Friday 20 April 2007

The week was not over before it proved to already be one of the bloodiest in Iraq's recent history. In fact, barely had Shiite religious leader Moqtada al-Sadr ordered the resignation of the ministers wearing his colors, than a series of explosions blasted out. Its source? The Sunni.

The chronology of the latest episode in the Iraqi tragedy began when the populist Sadr indicated that he would no longer collaborate in the management of state business. With that blow, he undoubtedly weakened Prime Minister al-Maliki's government, which, moreover, must fear that this empty-chair policy will be followed by another call to action. Which? That Sadr's deputies abstain from voting in the Parliament. Without their support, Maliki's survival will be hanging by a thread.

This withdrawal from current affairs decided by a leader about whom it is unknown whether he is still in Iraq or has fled to Iran follows directly from the military strategy ordered by President Bush at the beginning of the year. Under cover of the negotiations pertaining to the increase in the American contingent based in Iraq, Maliki and the White House had obtained [a pledge] that the members of the Mahdi Army Sadr heads would adopt a low profile. In other words, that they would leave their rifles and other weapons in the cupboards.

The Sunni militias capitalized on that self-restraint by employing methods more violent than ever before. Observing that their Shiite enemies had regrouped, if one may call it that, behind the frail screen constituted by the official army, they increased suicide attacks. And did so with an ardor all the more marked because they - with al-Qaeda at the head of the line - knew that the constitution of official forces as decided by the Pentagon was a gigantic fiasco. Here's why.

According to an analysis signed by Andrew Exum, an American officer, the Pentagon bonzes committed the master mistake of establishing a defense system that more or less reproduced the model set up in the United States. So what? The US system, turned towards the outside, was conceived to respond to foreign threats. But what Iraq needs right now is an infrastructure appropriate to confronting domestic threats.

The absence of perspicacity the Pentagon has displayed has been confirmed by this enormity: all Iraqis engaged in the armed forces have been forbidden to bring their weapons home. With no trust in the soldiers, it was feared that they would supply the different clans that are killing each other off with revolvers and other weapons. That has been noted on several occasions. But what has been observed most is that hundreds of the soldiers, along with their family members, have been massacred ... while they were unarmed.

Result: this large-scale carnage of Iraqis in uniform has had the effect of slowing down the rebuilding of the country's defenses enormously. And that for the reason you will already have guessed: the lines of individuals who decide to sign up have petered out as the rumors about the murders of those already enlisted have been confirmed. On this front, it must be said; American policy has proved to be a disaster.

So we were not surprised to learn that no later than yesterday the Democratic leader of the Senate, Harry Reid, declared: "The war is lost." Sticking obstinately to his policy, President Bush retorted by jeering at these observations, even though many Republicans have begun to share them. After preparing a war on the basis of lies, now President Bush is lying to himself.

Failing the Troops

April 19, 2007

Center for American Progress Senior Fellow Larry Korb testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday alongside a panel that included both retired generals and academics discussing the current and future state of the military.

“Not since the aftermath of the Vietnam War has the U.S. Army been so depleted,” said Korb in his testimony. “The simple fact is that the United States currently does not have enough troops who are ready and available for potential contingency missions in Iran, North Korea, or anywhere else.”

There was a remarkable unity among the senators and experts over the dangerous predicament our military and country are in. “I’m offended when I hear the Army is in trouble. It’s not the Army. It’s the American people,” said General Barry R. McCaffrey. “We wrecked the Army coming out of Vietnam; it took 10 years to recover. We are not going to get 10 years with this war.”

“Today’s ground operations in Iraq are progressively straining our ground forces in ways that were predictable and predicted,” said Senator Jim Webb (D-VA). Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) concurred, saying, “The Army and Marines are clearly overstretched and we must act promptly to fix these problems.”

Even Joe Lieberman (I-CT), the renowned Iraq war supporter, agreed that the current situation is untenable, saying that we need to “come to the aid of the U.S. Army,” and that the state of the military is an “indictment of the people and policies” of those responsible.

“Congress has been missing-in-action during the past several years while undebated and misguided strategies were implemented by former Secretary Rumsfeld and his team of arrogant and inexperienced civilian associates in the Pentagon,” said McCaffrey in his testimony. “We are failing our troops in that we are stretching them too thin and asking them to do more with much less.”

“We also have a moral responsibility to the young men and women that we take into the service, that before we put them in harm’s way, they are ready,” Korb emphasized. “We should not be taking those risks.”

The panel discussed both the moral and military elements involved in sending so many troops rated “not combat ready” into battle. “Learning to fight by fighting is the most wasteful way to train soldiers,” said Major General Robert H. Scales. “It’s not purely a numbers game. It is a quality game,” agreed Andrew F. Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The panel also discussed the detrimental effects of the military only—and barely—reaching its recruitment goals by lowering its standards. Such policies include raising the maximum age of soldiers from 35 to 42 in 2005, doubling the amount of non-high school graduates allowed since last year, raising the number of criminal offenders by 65 percent since 2003, and doubling the number of felons allowed from 2003.

Korb said that such policies have allowed an autistic man to be signed up to be a cavalry scout, as well as Private Steven Green, the soldier arrested for his alleged role in the rape of an Iraqi girl and the murder of her family. Green was allowed to enlist despite having legal, educational, and psychological problems.

“I urge you, do not lower the standards,” Korb said. “People, not hardware, need to be the highest priority if this is going to work.”

“I couldn’t agree with Dr. Korb more. Lowering the standards is the last thing we should do,” McCaffrey said. “Our recruiting is starting to unravel.”

Various senators expressed their concern about the military no longer demanding the best and the brightest. Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) warned, “The automatic promotion that is going on right now lends itself to the sort of problems we saw at Walter Reed.” McCaffrey agreed and said, “The skill of the officer corps is in jeopardy.”

“Because of our rotation schedule today, our Army and Marine corps have become simply too busy to learn,” said Scales. “[We need to] reform our human capital. You can’t throw money at this.”

The readiness and personnel crisis is so severe due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that the committee seriously discussed the prospect of whether a draft would be necessary if another conflict arises. “We must, at all costs, consider the all-volunteer force. I can’t see any measure where we should return to a draft at this time,” Sen. John Warner (R-VA) said.

“If you had a draft right now, you would no longer be in Iraq. The American people would say no,” Korb warned. “If the people are not willing to send their sons and daughters, we have to think very carefully about what we’re doing.”

Greetings from the Red Zone, Dispatches from a Five-Day Trip to Iraq

By Lawrence J. Korb April 17, 2007

Day 1: April 7, 2007

Greetings from the Red Zone. I was originally supposed to reside in the Green Zone at the Al Rashid Hotel. But the Green Zone is now referred to as the International Zone because of the repeated shellings (called indirect fire), and despite $36 million in repairs, the Al Rashid is a dump. The air conditioning doesn’t work at all, the elevators only sporadically, and the furniture looks like it was purchased at a yard sale (the reconstruction of the Al Rashid is a metaphor for most of the reconstruction projects in Iraq).

Therefore, after one sleepless night at the Al Rashid and on the advice of a State Department official I made the decision to move to a compound outside the Green Zone. (Given the events that transpired during my visit it was a smart move. Also, living in the compound got me out of the Green Zone and into the real Iraq.)

I am over here at the request of the National Academy of Public Administration—a congressionally chartered organization like the National Academy of Sciences, to which I was elected some 20 years ago—to work on the U.S. Agency for International Development’s National Capacity Development Project, known in Arabic as TATWEER.

The purpose of TATWEER is to assist the government of Iraq’s efforts to strengthen public administration in its civilian ministries. There is no doubt that if a democratically elected government of Iraq is unable to function effectively after our departure, it will not last very long. And to function effectively its policies must be carried out by an honest, nonpartisan civil service.

I arrived here on Saturday April 7 (Saddam Hussein’s birthday) on a flight from Amman. Besides myself and one other NAPA member, virtually all of the other non-Iraqis on the flight were contractors from companies like Blackwater, Halliburton, and Dynacorps. The person sitting next to me on the plane was from Blackwater. He looked like Bruce Willis and was about as talkative about the situation in Iraq and what he does there as Sgt. Friday from Dragnet.

The flight took about an hour to get to Baghdad but we circled the airport for another hour. I assume it was for safety reasons, but it seems to me that the best way to avoid being hit by a missile or a rocket-propelled grenade is to go right in. I know the circling had nothing to do with traffic because there was none. I counted seven aircraft on the ground and none of them moved during the hour.

Getting through Iraqi customs was a chore—it was like Moscow in the early 1990s. There were four lines: three for Iraqis and one for “others”. Like the majority of the passengers we went through the “others” line. It took at least an hour for me and my colleague to get through. The Blackwater and Halliburton people, however, went right around the line. One of the other less fortunate contractors remarked that it was not surprising since they are running the country.

The long wait did allow me to speak to some of the contractors about the situation on the ground. When I assured them I was not a member of the press, they were unanimous that the surge was not working. One of them said that members of Muqtada Al-Sadr’s militia have sold their guns and melted back into the population in Sadr City and will buy back their guns at the appropriate time (our own security guard said something similar).

My instructions were to look for my escorts when I got through customs, but for security reasons they would not have any signs with my name on it. Alas, when I got into the terminal there were two South African security guards with a “Welcome Larry Korb” sign. My security guards are veterans of the South African military who are armed with AK-47s and communicate in their walkie-talkies in an Afrikaner dialect that I am sure the insurgents cannot understand (in fact I have trouble understanding them when they speak English).

Before embarking on the road from the airport, I was given an armored vest and a helmet. The vest was infinitely better (and heavier—45 pounds) than the flak jacket I was issued on my last visit in 2003 and the helmets were not required then.

The ride from the airport in our General Motors SUV to the Al Rashid was uneventful. There were some cars on the road and we were part of a two-car convoy. We forced several Iraqi cars onto the side of the road and made several turns over the highway median to get to the Green Zone. (Maybe I am wrong but riding a General Motors car in Iraq would make one more of a target.)

Getting into the Green Zone (now the International Zone) was quite a chore. There were checkpoints manned by private contractors from Peru (employed by Triple Canopy), Georgian soldiers, and U.S. military personnel from the 1st Cavalry Division. (Because of our “Beyond the Call of Duty” report I now know the unit emblems.)

Saturday afternoon we had an Iraqi-style lunch with American and Iraqi officials where we sat on the ground and ate with our fingers. In discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the Iraqi government and political system and the American efforts to date, some intriguing facts emerged. The Iraqi civil service is modeled on that of Turkey; the number of Iraqis working for the government has jumped from 1.3 million in 2003 to about 2 million today (not including the security forces); the government functioned effectively in the 1970s and 1980s; and the decisions that the provinces are making with their allocations from the federal government are not coordinated or controlled from Baghdad. (I must admit that with the flies swarming around and the roar of helicopters and planes overhead it was hard to concentrate).

That evening at dinner, I had an interesting discussion with an Iraqi official who is close to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He made several intriguing observations. First, in their video conferences, Maliki and Bush do not really communicate. The official also noted that in his discussions with visiting members of Congress there is really not much dialogue, with both sides giving canned presentations. Second, the U.S. military and State Department do not really work well together and General George Casey would complain to Iraqis about the former U.S. Ambassador to iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. Third, the insurgency got started when the Americans failed to take control after the overthrow and the Iraqis realized that the American military was not invincible—that is, its soldiers were human beings who displayed the full range of emotions, including fear. Fourth, do not believe anyone who tells you that the situation is getting better.

Trying to sleep that night at the Al Rashid with the windows open was quite an adventure. Every few minutes it seemed like an F-15 or an Apache or Blackhawk would go roaring by and there would be occasional bursts of gunfire.

Day 2: April 8, 2007
Easter

We spent the entire day in the International Zone, also known as the Green Zone, meeting with members of the Iraqi government including career bureaucrats, members of Parliament, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Saleh, in their offices.

The career people were from the Ministry of Planning and the National Center for Consultancy and Management Development. As far as I can tell (though it is hard to tell) the MOP has responsibility for measuring the performance of Iraq’s 34 current ministries and NCCMD is the group that does the measuring (a poor man’s Office of Management and Budget).

My colleague gave a great PowerPoint presentation on the efforts of American presidents from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush to improve government performance. And while the Iraqis appeared to be interested in how organizations like OMB, the Congressional Budget Office, and the General Accounting Office functioned and how such ideas as reinventing government really worked, the session had an air of unreality about it. With the continuing chaos in Baghdad and the inability of the ministries to spend their investment budgets, it is hard to get too excited about performance measurement. Moreover, there is no doubt that corruption is rampant. In fact the Minister of Planning refers to it the second insurgency.

The session with the Parliamentarians in the convention center (which was attacked on April 12) was much more interesting. While Iraq is not a presidential system, the Iraqi Parliament—unlike most parliaments—sees itself as an independent and co-equal branch of government and is determined to serve as a check on the executive branch, even on members of its own party. And while there is much to applaud in this approach, it appears that currently this it is a recipe for gridlock (witness the failure so far to enact the hydrocarbon law that had been approved by the cabinet).

The meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister in his residence was fascinating. The meeting room resembled the Corcoran Gallery and Saleh, a Kurd who speaks English fluently, is quite articulate and charismatic, just the opposite of Maliki. In fact it dawned on me that he would go over much better with the media than Maliki. From what I was told every foreign government and international organization wants to deal with him.

Saleh said all the right things but after a while it seemed he was telling us what we wanted to hear; that is, his goals are creating a unified Iraq, providing scholarships for younger civil servants regardless of ethnic background, reducing the size of government, and making the legislature strong enough to bring down the government (including him). My impression was confirmed by an American official who told me that you never know what to believe about him—one day he is an ardent Iraqi nationalist, the next day he is a Kurdish separatist.

Day 3: April 9, 2007
The Fourth Anniversary of the Fall of Saddam

To avoid any problems, the government imposed a 24-hour curfew (actually Maliki declared it a government holiday). During the three-mile drive from our compound to the Green Zone and back, I noticed that there were only a handful of cars and trucks on the road and a small number people out of their homes. It is hard to believe that four years after our “victory,” the only way to provide safety is to lock down the capital city.

We spent the morning listening to briefings from consultants advising the individual ministries on the TATWEER project. Most were American and many spoke Arabic. Listening to the briefings, it is easy to see how people making a quick visit to the region with very little understanding of the situation can go away with the impression that things are getting better and that there is “light at the end of the tunnel.” These men and women believe in what they are doing and are close to their clients.

But if one uses the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and pushes the briefers, a different picture emerges. The place is a mess and despite the almost heroic efforts of some Americans and some Iraqis it is not getting better. One of the consultants told me not to believe anyone who says that the situation is getting better.

In the afternoon (it lasted from 12 p.m. to 4 p.m.) we had a luncheon meeting with about a dozen leading American and Iraqi officials. The American delegation included the heads of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (the successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority), the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of Economic Reconstruction. The Iraqi delegation included the Iraqi ministers of National Security, Health, and Higher Education and the Deputy Minister of Interior, plus a member of Maliki’s staff and a Parliamentarian. This session also had an air of unreality.

The city was in lockdown, 10 American soldiers had died the day before, and the citizens of Najaf and the Sunni Scholars were calling for an end to the occupation. Yet we had a seven-course meal and the American officials and the Iraqis were exchanging diplomatic pleasantries about the progress they were making.

I had the good fortune to sit next to the Deputy Minister of Interior (the ministry responsible for the national police). He told me that the problem with the police is not training but loyalty and motivation—he cannot get enough officers to come to Baghdad, even though controlling Baghdad is critical to the establishment of a unified Iraq. He also said that Muqtada Al-Sadr still controls six ministries, including his own.

Day 4: April 10, 2007

The day started out normally but was anything but. In the morning we met at the Republican Palace with Ambassador Saleh, the outgoing head of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, the successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority. The first thing that strikes you upon entering the Republican Palace that houses IRMO and most of the American citizens is how much tighter the security has become. In November 2003, we just showed our IDs and went in. Now, there are series of checkpoints and searches that seem to take forever.

There also seems to be 10 times more people walking up and down the corridors of the palace and Ambassador Saloom’s office is much more modest than that of Viceroy Bremer (Paul Bremer, former head of the CPA).

As might be expected, Saloom was upbeat about Iraq’s progress, citing such positive indicators as the number of satellite dishes and the amount of goods in the stores. But the dishes have been there since 2003 (in fact, in my meeting with Bremer in November 2003 he said the same thing), and while the shops may be full, it does not appear that many people are out shopping.

Saloom also dismissed the concerns expressed in the Special Inspector General’s report about the lack of coordination between the U.S. military and civilians and attributed the dust-up between Secretaries Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates about the small number of State Department civilians being assigned to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a communication problem. In light of the new White House plan to create a powerful czar to oversee Iraq and Afghanistan, Saloom’s comments seem unreal.

The ambassador did make a good point about the fact that as a result of all the inspections and audits an error-avoidance mentality has permeated the Iraqi bureaucracy and this has had a chilling effect on its ability to take action. There is no doubt that this is one reason none of the Iraqi ministries have yet to spend even 25 percent of their investment budget. If they do not do this by the end of June, the Finance Minister has threatened to take the money back (my suggestion that they use these unspent funds to fund the war until the supplemental passes was not greeted enthusiastically by the American officials).

On our way into the Republican Palace, our security people told us that a helicopter had been brought down by fire, at least three American soldiers had been killed in Baghdad, and the Green Zone was taking indirect fire. Consequentially we could not leave the Green Zone until 1 p.m. and our afternoon meeting on the east side of the Tigris had to be canceled.

While waiting to leave the Green Zone after our IRMO meeting, we visited the military exchange, or PX, and the “pharmacy” (liquor store—the Iraqis call it the Christian pharmacy). I was surprised and saddened that the servicemen and women pay the same prices for goods in Iraq as they do in the states.

Day 5: April 11, 2007

In the morning we had to travel to the east side of the Tigris for a meeting with NCCMD to discuss our proposals for improving the performance of the Iraqi government. A rainstorm had flooded the streets and made a bad traffic situation infinitely worse. Even our normally unflappable security guards were concerned.

To say the least, the 10-mile trip out the Assassin’s Gate and over the al Jumhuriya Bridge and around Tahrir Square was an adventure as our three-car convoy drove over several medians, went the wrong way on a four-lane road and blew their siren constantly to get Iraqis to move aside for our SUVs. While I was glad that these steps enhanced our safety, I wondered what the Iraqis thought of the maneuvers.

The other thing that struck me was the lack of American soldiers patrolling the neighborhoods. In fact, in my whole time here I did not see one American soldier outside the Green Zone.

The meeting with NCCMD was anticlimactic. We and they made some useful suggestions about empowering existing organizations to help improve government performance. What most impressed me was the desire of this group to do the right thing. But they have a small budget and very few people.

Our last event was a debrief for the U.S. Agency for International Development leadership in its very own compound (where they live and work). The people from AID pointed out that while there were some Iraqis trying to do the right thing, the rules have changed so much that nobody is sure about what they are supposed to do and that it is hard to know who or what to believe. An Iraqi working for AID told me we should have allowed the transition government to stay in power much longer.

Conclusion

To say that Iraq in general and Baghdad in particular are much worse than on my last visit would be an understatement. It is hard to believe that after about 3,300 deaths, about 25,000 wounded, an expenditure of $500 billion, and two national elections things could be this bad. (The day I left was the day that the Parliamentarians were killed and the al-Sarafiya bridge was blown up.)

The real issue is if the latest surge will work. The most optimistic projection was “maybe temporarily.” But most people speaking off the record believe that the insurgents will shift to other areas and lay low for a while in Baghdad.

I knew that the Iraqi government was not very effective, but I had no idea it was so bad. The national government already has 34 cabinet-level ministries and is creating about five more. The best civil servants have been de-Baathified and left the country (in fact, I ran into a couple of them at the Baghdad Airport on my way out). The remaining two million civil servants are underpaid, have little motivation, and are hamstrung by a set of rules and regulations that combines the worst elements of Soviet and American bureaucracies.

No one in or out of the American or Iraqi government seemed to have a good answer to my question: “how does it end?” On the back of this visit, I am more and more convinced that we must take control of our own destiny by setting a specific timetable for withdrawal. Currently, our fate is in the hands of an Iraqi government that does not have any real incentive to get its act together and does not even seem to understand the gravity of the situation or the declining level of support in the United States.

While I did not see as many soldiers as on my last visit, the ones I spoke to were clearly dispirited about the repeated deployments and the three-month extension.

Hidden wounds plague GIs / TENS OF THOUSANDS OF IRAQ WAR VETS HAVE SUFFERED BRAIN INJURIES, BUT A DIAGNOSIS CAN TAKE YEARS

By Erin Emery Denver Post Staff Writer
Article Last Updated: 04/16/2007 06:15:19 AM MDT

Gary Watts, who sustained a traumatic brain injury while serving in Iraq, trains sniffer dogs as part of his rehabilitation. Training a dog requires repetition of commands, and the repetition can help heal Watts' brain. (Post / Kathryn Scott Osler)Colorado Springs - After the 5-ton Army truck stopped tumbling down an embankment in Iraq, Gary Watts found himself standing on his head, upside down in the cab of the truck.

"All I had was a sore neck and a bad, bad headache," Watts said.

He rested for a couple of days after the July 24, 2003, accident, then went back to work. He would listen to his commander's directions but hear only pieces of sentences. Twice, he ended up in the wrong convoy in Iraq, driving a truckload of supplies to the wrong place. His bosses chewed him out, and fellow soldiers made fun of him.

It took nearly three years for doctors to diagnose Watts with what is now known as the signature wound of this war - traumatic brain injury.

"Unfortunately, this may be what we are now creating, a whole population of people who are going to be mildly to moderately brain-injured," said Dr. Sheldon Goldberg, medical director of Porter Adventist's rehabilitation unit. "Just as Christopher Reeve's spinal-cord injury brought spinal- cord injury into the limelight for the public to try and understand, I think very sadly our returning Iraq veterans are going to be bringing traumatic brain injury into the limelight now."

Last week, Fort Carson revealed that 17.8 percent of troops who returned to the mountain post from Iraq in the past two years had a traumatic brain injury, or TBI.

Of 13,400 soldiers screened in the past two years, nearly 2,400 of them had brain injuries. Of those, 13 percent were not fit to return to Iraq. In many cases, those soldiers were medically discharged from the Army.

Camp Pendleton in California, Fort Bragg in North Carolina and Fort Hood in Texas found that between 10 percent and 20 percent of returning soldiers suffered brain injuries, most from improvised explosive devices, according to Charles Dasey, spokesman for the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. At Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., 30 percent of soldiers admitted had a brain injury.

"When you consider that 1.5 million people have served in Iraq, that's 150,000 to 300,000 people who have TBI, and that's an enormous, enormous problem that requires immediate action," said Paul Sullivan, executive director of Veterans for Common Sense, a nonprofit advocacy group for vets.

Damage can be cumulative

In high-velocity, concussive-type accidents, the brain is like molded Jell-O tossed around in a wooden box. For soldiers who are exposed to dozens of blasts from improvised explosive devices, the likelihood of more damage increases with each event.

The severity of traumatic brain injuries varies, and it affects each person differently. Many soldiers recover within hours or in one to three months. For some, the brain may never heal.

"What happens to these people is, they don't become stupid. It's not that these people lose their cognitive ability; they just lose the ability to get the messages from one part of the brain to the other as fast as they used to," Goldberg said.

Watts, 35, now receives 100 percent disability from the Department of Veterans Affairs. He lives with his wife, Danelle, 32, and their 10-month-old daughter, McKenna, in the mountain community of Divide.

After his injury, Watts knew something was wrong with his brain. He blew up at other soldiers when he thought they had moved his belongings.

Before he left Iraq and headed home in March 2004, a doctor did a checkup. Watts told him during the exam that he had an accident and memory loss, but at the time, brain injuries were not on the radar of Army doctors.

"They said: 'Well, that's kind of common over here in a war environment. Once you get back home, you should straighten out, so let your doctor know when you get back,' " Watts said.

In recent months, veterans advocacy groups have been critical of the military's medical community because the Pentagon has not released hard numbers on how many troops have suffered from traumatic brain injuries.

Dr. Jonathan Jaffin, an Army colonel and acting commander of the Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command, said the difficulty comes from a diagnostic dilemma.

"The question is: 'Who has had a brain injury?' The severe ones, that's easy. ... When you think about football players, how many football players get their bell rung? If you really look, a lot of them do. So getting that exact number of the mild ones can be tough," Jaffin said.

The other challenge is that most traumatic brain injuries heal without medical care. If a soldier shows no symptoms, screening for a TBI does not occur at the nation's Army installations. Veterans organizations want the military to document when a soldier has been exposed to a blast, should symptoms arise in the future.

Last week, a nine-member independent review group selected by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to respond to deficiencies in outpatient care at Walter Reed Army Medical Center recommended that the military adopt a policy for recording any exposure to a blast in a patient's medical record, develop a coding system to record TBI, and screen troops before and after deployment to measure functional/cognitive abilities.

Symptoms only got worse

As Watts continued fighting the war in Iraq, his symptoms became worse. He couldn't dismantle and assemble his Army rifle, a task that used to be as simple as tying his shoes. The Army sent Watts - considered a "go-to" guy - to Fort Hood to take a course and a test he needed for promotion. Watts failed the written test twice.

Before he left Fort Hood, two roommates told him they noticed something wasn't right with him.

"I broke down, and I said: 'Hey, I had an accident in Iraq. My head bounced all over the cab, and ever since then my memory has just been useless. I don't even remember your name, and you're my roomie. ... If you don't have it on your shirt, I don't know."'

Back at Fort Carson, doctors diagnosed him with traumatic brain injury, but a medical board wanted more tests. He received a final diagnosis in late April 2006.

Danelle Watts said her husband becomes irritable because he is frustrated that he can't remember what used to be automatic.

"He doesn't remember what day of the week it is, when holidays are," she said.

On a white, dry erase board, she reminds him: "Today is Wednesday, April 4."

Before he was discharged from the Army in July, Watts got lost going to work at Fort Carson. After their daughter was born, Danelle had to quit the Army because her husband was not able to care for the girl himself.

Goldberg, the rehabilitation doctor, said there is no cure for traumatic brain injury. Whether Watts will fully recover is not known, but since he left the Army, he has begun to feel better.

He tries to manage his days and limit the unexpected.

"I'm not lazy, but I try to do as little as possible. If something pops up that I can't control, that I can't predict is going to happen, it throws a wrench in the works and I don't know how to handle it," Watts said.

The key to helping people with brain injuries is providing a safe, supportive environment, Goldberg said.

For the Watts family, that help came from Debra Berthold, a retired Army colonel who works with the Army's Wounded Warrior Program.

Berthold called the family in August, when the Wattses were down to the last $30 in their checking account. Watts was out of the Army, and veterans' benefits hadn't kicked in.

The Wounded Warrior Program is designed "to make sure that we don't do to these soldiers what we've done to our Vietnam soldiers," Berthold said. Anyone who is given a ranking of 30 percent or more disability from the VA is eligible for help. Berthold has a caseload of 60 soldiers, and 80 percent of them have a brain injury.

It's where Watts has received vocational-rehabilitation benefits.

For at least 30 hours a week, he works with Carl Reif, president of Advanced K-9 Training Inc., to learn to train dogs to detect drugs, bombs and cadavers and find lost people.

Training a dog requires repetition, and that repetition - giving the same commands again and again - will help strengthen Watts' brain.

"If the brain is a connection of millions and billions of circuits, and all of a sudden a whole bunch of these circuits are torn or damaged in a very minute way," Reif said, "... what you need to do is to keep sending the same message through on those circuits, to either help heal up those circuits or create new circuits within the brain that go around the injured area."

Watts trains two times a month with Denver-area police officers in the hope that one day he'll be able to have his own dog-training business. Over and over again, he practices.

"There's not a prosthetic brain out there, so no, it's never going to be normal again," Danelle said. "Can he work ways around it? Yes. Are there ways to make it better? Yes. Is it going to take a long time? Sometimes."

Staff writer Erin Emery can be reached at 719-522-1360 or eemery@denverpost.com.


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17.8%
Percentage of 13,400 soldiers at Fort Carson screened in the past two years who had experienced at least a mild traumatic brain injury


30%
Soldiers admitted to Walter Reed Army Medical Center who have suffered traumatic brain injuries


1,977
Troops treated by the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center since the beginning of the war in Iraq


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Q&A
Fort Carson provides the following educational sheet to soldiers to help them understand TBI:

Q: What is a traumatic brain injury?

A: A traumatic brain injury is a blow or jolt to the head or a penetrating head injury that disrupts the function of the brain. Not all blows or jolts to the head result in a TBI. The severity of such an injury may range from "mild," a brief change in mental status or consciousness, to "severe," an extended period of unconsciousness or amnesia after the injury.

Q: What causes TBI?

A: Bomb blasts are the leading cause of TBI, though bullets, fragments, falls, motor vehicle accidents and assaults can cause the injury.

Q: What are the symptoms of TBI?

A: Headaches, dizziness, excessive fatigue, concentration problems, forgetting things, irritability, sleep problems, balance problems, ringing in the ears, vision changes. Symptoms of mild TBI or concussion may resolve within hours or days, or may improve over one to three months.

Q: How to recover from TBI:

A: Get plenty of sleep and don't overexert yourself during the day.

Return to normal activities gradually.

Until you are better, avoid activities that can lead to a second brain injury, such as contact or recreational sports.

Don't drink alcohol; it may slow your brain recovery.

If it's hard to remember things, write them down.

If you find you are losing important items, put them in the same place all the time. Park your car in the same place so you can find it.

If you feel irritable, remove yourself from the situation.

Be patient because brain injuries take time to heal.

Keep your brain active by doing activities that require strategies and fine motor skills, such as crossword puzzles, playing musical instruments, drawing, writing, painting, and playing cards and board games.

Sadr Ministers Quit Iraqi Government Over US Troops

By Waleed Ibrahim and Ross Colvin Reuters Monday 16 April 2007

Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his ministers to quit Iraq's government on Monday in protest at Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal.

Sadr's populist movement, which draws its support mainly from Iraq's Shi'ite poor, holds six ministries and a quarter of the parliamentary seats in Maliki's fractious Shi'ite Alliance, a coalition of Shi'ite Islamist parties.

While Sadr was instrumental in Maliki becoming prime minister last year, the move is unlikely to significantly weaken the government since Sadr's movement does not hold any key cabinet portfolios. It could actually help Maliki by giving him a freer hand to pursue his political policies.

At the same there will be concerns about keeping the anti-American cleric and militia leader engaged in the political process, even though the Sadrists said they would remain in parliament.

Washington has called the Mehdi Army, a Shi'ite militia that claims loyalty to Sadr, the biggest threat to Iraq's security.

The Sadrists accused Maliki of "ignoring the will of the people" over the timetable issue and also failing to improve basic services and effectively deal with deteriorating security. Baghdad's Sadr City slum is the cleric's main powerbase.

"The prime minister has to express the will of the Iraqi people. They went out in a demonstration in their millions asking for a timetable for withdrawal. We noticed the prime minister's response did not express the will of the people, " the head of the Sadrist bloc in parliament, Nassar al-Rubaie told a news conference.

Tens of thousands of Iraqis answered a call by Sadr to rally in the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf last week to protest against the presence of more than 140,000 U.S.-led forces in Iraq. Sadr himself did not appear - U.S. officials say he is in hiding in Iran, while his aides say he is still in Iraq.

Maliki said afterwards he saw no need to set a timetable. He said his government was working to build up Iraq's security forces as quickly as possible so U.S.-led forces could leave.

"For the public benefit and lifting the suffering of the patient Iraqi people ... we found it necessary to issue an order to the ministers of the Sadrist bloc to withdraw immediately from the Iraqi government," Rubaie said, reading a statement on behalf of Sadr.

Internal Dissent

One analyst said Sadr could be acting to quell internal dissent over his support for a U.S.-Iraqi security crackdown which has failed to stop car bombings blamed on Sunni Islamist al Qaeda that have targeted Shi'ite neighborhoods in Baghdad.

"Sadr is coming under pressure because of his tacit support of the security plan ... So he has to restore internal discipline, which he does by withdrawing from the political process and going back to the street," said Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group think tank.

Before he entered mainstream politics, Sadr's Mehdi Army fought two uprisings against the Americans in 2004. Since then, the militia has been involved in tit-for-tat attacks against minority Sunni Arabs amid spiraling sectarian violence.

The militia has kept a low profile since the launch of the Baghdad security plan, reportedly on the orders of Sadr.

The Sadrists ended a two-month boycott of parliament in January after pulling out in protest over the timetable issue and a meeting between Maliki and U.S. President George W. Bush. They returned after a deal was brokered.

"Nobody really missed them - their seats were patronage places. Maliki will appoint new ministers and try to bring in people who are more competent," Hiltermann said.

US Troop Deaths Up 21 Percent in Iraq

By Robert H. Reid The Associated Press Saturday 14 April 2007

Civilian deaths down in Baghdad but up elsewhere since start of security operation.
Baghdad - Iraqi civilian deaths have fallen in Baghdad in the two months since the Feb. 14 start of the U.S.-led offensive, according to an Associated Press tally. Outside the capital, civilian deaths are up as Sunni and Shiite extremists shift their operations to avoid the crackdown.

And the sweeps have taken a heavy toll on U.S. forces: Deaths among American soldiers climbed 21 percent in Baghdad compared with the previous two months.

Since the crackdown began Feb. 14, U.S. military officials have spoken of encouraging signs that security is improving in the capital but have cautioned against drawing any firm conclusions until at least the summer.

Figures compiled by the AP from Iraqi police reports show that 1,586 civilians were killed in Baghdad between the start of the offensive and Thursday.

That represents a sharp drop from the 2,871 civilians who died violently in the capital during the two months that preceded the security crackdown.

Outside the capital, 1,504 civilians were killed between Feb. 14 and Thursday, compared with 1,009 deaths during the two previous months, the figures show.

"We know this increased security presence and cooperation from the people is having an impact in Baghdad," U.S. military spokesman Maj. Gen. William C. Caldwell said this week. "It is a good beginning, but it is not nearly enough. The violence across the rest of Iraq remains at unacceptable levels." Click Here To Tell Us Your Story. U.S. officials have cautioned that numbers alone cannot provide a complete picture of the security situation.

The Baghdad crackdown was designed to provide the Iraqi government with what U.S. officials call a "secure platform" and to buy time for the country's religious and ethnically based political parties to agree on key reforms.

So far there has been little progress on that front.

Sunni and Shiite militants remain a potent force - regardless of whether they are slaughtering civilians in the capital at the previous rate.

On Thursday, extremists managed to penetrate the most secure part of the capital - the Green Zone - and launch a suicide attack in the building where the Iraqi parliament meets.

Earlier in the day, a suicide truck bomber heavily damaged a major bridge across the Tigris River, collapsing part of the span into the muddy waters.

Such spectacular attacks may not produce a large number of civilian casualties. But they undermine public confidence - which the U.S. military believes is essential for lasting stability.

"It is not going to be possible to see just how well the resulting mix of capabilities will counter the insurgency until the late spring of 2008 at the earliest," wrote former Pentagon analyst Anthony Cordesman. "The various insurgents and hostile groups may be weakened or suppressed early on, but will do their best to react."

It is unclear why deaths outside Baghdad have increased. However, U.S. military officials say both Sunni and Shiite extremists left Baghdad ahead of the crackdown, instead stepping up their operations in a belt of communities around the capital.

The rise in deaths outside Baghdad may also be partly a result of clashes in Anbar province between al-Qaida extremists and Sunni tribes that have broken with the extremist movement.

For example, at least 52 people were killed Feb. 24 when a suicide truck bomber struck worshippers leaving a Sunni mosque in Anbar after the mosque's preacher spoke out against al-Qaida.

Also, hundreds of Shiites died last month in a spate of bombings and shootings during a religious holiday - including 120 Shiite pilgrims killed by a pair of suicide bombers in Hillah.

One key finding of the figures: Although civilians deaths are down in the capital, a careful analysis of the figures shows that sectarian tensions remain high.

Of the 1,586 civilians killed in Baghdad since the start of the crackdown, more than half - or 832 - appear to have been the victims of sectarian death squads. Their bodies were found scattered around the city. That number represents a significant drop from the 1,754 bodies found in the capital during the two months before the crackdown, according to AP figures. Still, the figure shows that the security crackdown has been unable to stop death squads entirely.

Furthermore, the number of civilians killed by suicide bombers has risen in Baghdad - 352 during the crackdown compared with 279 in the two months before.

Suicide bombings are considered the signature attack of Sunni religious extremists, including al-Qaida in Iraq. And most of the suicide attacks occurred in largely Shiite areas of the capital, indicating attacks on Shiites by Sunnis.

The AP count includes civilians as well as government officials and police and security forces, and is considered a minimum based on AP reporting.

The United Nations had been releasing monthly civilian casualty figures compiled from information received from the Iraqi Health Ministry, hospitals across the country and the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad.

However, the U.N. office in Baghdad has not released a casualty report since late January. U.N. officials in Baghdad have been saying for weeks that new figures would be released soon and have offered no explanation for the delay.

Iraqi officials had complained that the U.N. figures were too high.