Monday, June 13, 2005

Could Memo Sink Bush?

By Dave Richardson The Times Herald-Record UK Monday 13 June 2005
Hinchey, others demand answers on Downing Street Memo.

What if President Bush lied to Congress and the American people, used those lies to gain congressional approval for military action against Iraq and launched a war that killed 1,700 Americans and tens of thousands of others?

That might have been a hypothetical question a month ago; it might not be hypothetical anymore.

In fact, Rep. Maurice Hinchey, D-Hurley, says the answer to the question could lead to the impeachment of President Bush.

The release of an explosive piece of paper called the Downing Street Memo has Hinchey, almost 90 members of Congress and people around the world in an uproar.

The memo provides the closest thing to proof Bush may have lied about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and led the nation into an unnecessary war, Hinchey and others say.

"Attacking Iraq was something the administration focused on from the very beginning," Hinchey said. "Bush made the policy, then altered, twisted and distorted the facts to fit the policy."

According to published reports in Britain, the Downing Street Memo, written in July, 2002 details a conversation in which British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of British intelligence, and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw discuss a meeting held with U.S. officials on Iraq.

In the memo, Dearlove warns Blair that Bush had already decided to attack Iraq - months before Bush brought the question to the U.N., and while he continued to deny, both to Congress and publicly, any plans to do so. Dearlove warned that Bush sought to justify that policy by fabricating evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi links to Al Qaeda and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

"There was a perceptible shift in attitude," the memo quotes Dearlove as saying. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.

"But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy."

The Times of London made the memo public May 1, and has continued to hammer it in its pages.

High-ranking current and former members of both in the British and U.S. governments have reportedly confirmed the memo's authenticity.

Until now, the story has been largely ignored by the U.S. news media and dismissed by the Bush administration. But it has prompted massive interest and widespread outrage abroad and is a hot topic on internet blogs.

In the U.S., that outrage is also growing.

On May 5, Rep. John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat, sent a letter to Bush demanding answers about the memo.

"If the disclosure is accurate, it raises troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity of your own administration," Conyers wrote.

The letter was signed by 88 other members of Congress. Conyers has at least 90,000 signatures on a petition demanding the same, and hopes to have more than 500,000 soon.

Massachusetts Sen. Ted Kennedy has a similar petition, and California Rep. Maxine Waters has vowed to introduce daily amendments to pending House legislation demanding Bush answer questions raised by the memo.

Hinchey signed Conyers' letter, and had harsh words for Bush. "The Downing Street Memo confirms a lot of information coming from insiders in the administration and the intelligence agencies, and says clearly that they fixed the facts around the policy," Hinchey said.

So far there has been no official response to Conyers' letter.

"They are trying to ignore the letter, but we will be back to them on this. We will continue to press this," Hinchey said. "It's outrageous. It goes against everything this country stands for."

Representatives of both Sens. Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton declined to comment directly on the memo or on the House response to it.

Still, calls for a congressional inquiry into the questions raised by the memo are growing louder, with some even discussing a Bush impeachment.

"If the president intentionally twisted the facts about the Sept. 11 attacks and the Iraq war, and lied to Congress about it, and then elicited authorization from Congress to launch a war that's caused the deaths of 1,700 U.S. men and women along with tens of thousands of others, that is definitely an impeachable offense," Hinchey said.

Downing Street Excerpts

Key excerpts from the Downing Street Memo, dated July 23, 2002, as reported May 1 in the Times of London. The memo details a conversation between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and key ministers about a meeting held with U.S. officials on Iraq months before the Bush administration officially decided to go to war.

"Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and (weapons of mass destruction.) But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy."

"But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

"There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath of the war."

Yesterday, the Times released details of a briefing paper written two days before the Downing Street memo. The Times reported:

"Ministers were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to taking part in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no choice but to find a way of making it legal."
"The briefing paper warned that regime-change was not a legal option, the U.S. and Britain would find it 'necessary to create the conditions' to make the invasion legal."

Full Text of British Briefing Papers Revealed -- More Documents Allege Fixing of Intel

Monday 13 June 2005

As noted previously on ThinkProgress, the American media had failed to report on the British Briefing Papers - covered by the British media last September - that showed that the British felt the pre-war evidence for attacking Iraq was weak and that the U.S. lacked a plan to address the post-war situation. Using the Downing Street Minutes to bring light to these Briefing Papers, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus wrote a front-page story this weekend calling attention to the charges in those documents.

In a headline entitled, "Memo: U.S. Lacked Full Postwar Iraq Plan," Pincus uncovered a British memo warning of post-war instability that would arise because the Bush administration was unrealistic about the post-war phase. A number of the Papers in the Pincus article are attached below. As one of the Papers warns, the U.S. had no plans for "what happens on the morning after [attacking Iraq]."

The main thrust of the British Briefing Papers certainly focused on the Bush administration's failure to plan, but there's another key point in the Papers which Pincus chose not to highlight, a point which meshes well with the revelations in the Downing Street Minutes. As you know, the Downing Street Minutes said the Bush administration "fixed" the intelligence around its policy of attacking Iraq. The British Briefing Papers lend further credence to this point.

British Knew Iraqi WMD Were Not a Threat: "There is no greater threat now that [Saddam] will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option." [Iraq: Options Paper]

Evidence Did Not Show Much Advance In Iraq's Weapons Programs: "Even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on [the] nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up." [Ricketts Paper, 3/22/02]

Evidence Was Thin on Iraq/Al Qaeda Ties: "US is scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al [Qaida] is so far frankly unconvincing." [Ricketts Paper, 3/22/02]

"No Credible Evidence" On Iraq/Al Qaeda Link: "There has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida." [Straw Paper, 3/25/02]

Wolfowitz Knew Supposed Iraq/Al Qaeda Link Was Weak: Wolfowitz said that "there might be doubt about the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker on 9/11, and Iraqi intelligence (did we, he asked, know anything more about this meeting?)." [Meyer Paper, 3/18/02]

The full British Briefing Papers have been attached below. When reading them, keep in mind that these Papers were written approximately a full year before the invasion of Iraq. The Papers present a shockingly accurate forecast of what has transpired in the years since, and suggest the Bush administration chose to ignore the advice of our key ally when it came to dealing with Iraq.

British Iraq Options Paper
Manning Paper
Meyer Paper
Ricketts Paper
Straw Paper
British Legal Background Paper

Sunday, June 12, 2005

Cabinet Office Paper: Conditions for Military Action

The Sunday Times UK Sunday 12 June 2005

The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the source.

Personal Secret UK Eyes Only

Iraq: Conditions for Military Action (A Note by Officials)

Summary

Ministers are invited to:

(1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for possible action.

(2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic political strategy, which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions necessary to justify government military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August.

(4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002.

(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US.

Introduction

1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it.

2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.

3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US Government to place its military planning within a political framework, partly to forestall the risk that military action is precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support.

4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK support for military action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, and other considerations taken into account. This note sets them out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US Government. Depending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on whether and in what form the UK takes part in military action.

The Goal

5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in the view of UK officials, that one would necessarily follow from the other. Even if regime change is a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

US Military Planning

6. Although no political decisions have been taken, US military planners have drafted options for the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a 'Running Start', military action could begin as early as November of this year, with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land forces deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the collapse of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up before any military action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military plans include no specifics on the strategic context either before or after the campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for the 'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail.

7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever option Ministers choose with regard to UK participation.

The Viability of the Plans

8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. Their initial view is that there are a number of questions which would have to be answered before they could assess whether the plans are sound. Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight.

UK Military Contribution

9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US military planning and the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD is examining how the UK might contribute to US-led action. The options range from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK could not generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in time, provided adequate basing arrangements could be made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK military involvement include the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which there is no financial provision.

The Conditions Necessary for Military Action

10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the following conditions necessary for military action and UK participation: justification/legal base; an international coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of domestic opinion.

Justification

11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. But regime change could result from action that is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective self-defence, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared earlier this year, is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in both the first two instances but would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality. Further legal advice would be needed on this point.

12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons inspectors. These have made no substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating. Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be allowed to continue ad infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this.

13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible that they will encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely when they are fully operational.

14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003.

An International Coalition

15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform and desirable for political purposes.

16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except granting military over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be necessary.

17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing the support of NATO and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK. France might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to improve their US relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the region would be neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in military action. In practice, much of the international community would find it difficult to stand in the way of the determined course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater the prospects of success.

A Quiescent Israel-Palestine

18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian violence for the time being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking more trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at best a half step forward. We are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make progress, including a resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a ministerial conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly likely. The co-incidence of such an upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to bolster popular Arab support for his regime.

Benefits/Risks

19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective as set out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in particular what form of Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military action on other UK interests in the region.

Domestic Opinion

20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action.

Timescales

21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only because of the time it will take to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that for climactic reasons, military action would need to start by January 2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn.

22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. This means that:

(a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before President Bush is briefed on 4 August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels;

Memo: US Lacked Full Postwar Iraq Plan

By Walter Pincus The Washington Post Sunday 12 June 2005

Advisers to Blair predicted instability.

A briefing paper prepared for British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top advisers eight months before the US-led invasion of Iraq concluded that the US military was not preparing adequately for what the British memo predicted would be a "protracted and costly" postwar occupation of that country.

The eight-page memo, written in advance of a July 23, 2002, Downing Street meeting on Iraq, provides new insights into how senior British officials saw a Bush administration decision to go to war as inevitable, and realized more clearly than their American counterparts the potential for the post-invasion instability that continues to plague Iraq.

In its introduction, the memo "Iraq: Conditions for Military Action" notes that US "military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace," but adds that "little thought" has been given to, among other things, "the aftermath and how to shape it."

The July 21 memo was produced by Blair's staff in preparation for a meeting with his national security team two days later that has become controversial on both sides of the Atlantic since last month's disclosure of official notes summarizing the session.

In those meeting minutes - which have come to be known as the Downing Street Memo - British officials who had just returned from Washington said Bush and his aides believed war was inevitable and were determined to use intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his relations with terrorists to justify invasion of Iraq.

The "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," said the memo - an assertion attributed to the then-chief of British intelligence, and denied by US officials and by Blair at a news conference with Bush last week in Washington. Democrats in Congress led by Rep. John Conyers Jr. (Mich.), however, have scheduled an unofficial hearing on the matter for Thursday.

Now, disclosure of the memo written in advance of that meeting - and other British documents recently made public - show that Blair's aides were not just concerned about Washington's justifications for invasion but also believed the Bush team lacked understanding of what could happen in the aftermath.

In a section titled "Benefits/Risks," the July 21 memo states, "Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks."

Saying that "we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective," the memo's authors point out, "A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." The authors add, "As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden."

That memo and other internal British government documents were originally obtained by Michael Smith, who writes for the London Sunday Times. Excerpts were made available to The Washington Post, and the material was confirmed as authentic by British sources who sought anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the matter.

The Bush administration's failure to plan adequately for the postwar period has been well documented. The Pentagon, for example, ignored extensive State Department studies of how to achieve stability after an invasion, administer a postwar government and rebuild the country. And administration officials have acknowledged the mistake of dismantling the Iraqi army and canceling pensions to its veteran officers - which many say hindered security, enhanced anti-US feeling and aided what would later become a violent insurgency.

Testimony by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of Iraq policy, before a House subcommittee on Feb. 28, 2003, just weeks before the invasion, illustrated the optimistic view the administration had of postwar Iraq. He said containment of Hussein the previous 12 years had cost "slightly over $30 billion," adding, "I can't imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $30 billion to be there for another 12 years." As of May, the Congressional Research Service estimated that Congress has approved $208 billion for the war in Iraq since 2003.

The British, however, had begun focusing on doubts about a postwar Iraq in early 2002, according to internal memos.

A March 14 memo to Blair from David Manning, then the prime minister's foreign policy adviser and now British ambassador in Washington, reported on talks with then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Among the "big questions" coming out of his sessions, Manning reported, was that the president "has yet to find the answers . . . [and] what happens on the morning after."

About 10 days later, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote a memo to prepare Blair for a meeting in Crawford, Tex., on April 8. Straw said "the big question" about military action against Hussein was, "how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be any better," as "Iraq has no history of democracy."

Straw said the US assessments "assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured...."

Later in the summer, the postwar doubts would be raised again, at the July 23 meeting memorialized in the Downing Street Memo. Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6, the British intelligence service, reported on his meetings with senior Bush officials. At one point, Dearlove said, "There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

Republican Party Chairman Ken Mehlman, appearing June 5 on "Meet the Press," disagreed with Dearlove's remark. "I think that there was clearly planning that occurred."

The Blair government, unlike its US counterparts, always doubted that coalition troops would be uniformly welcomed, and sought U.N. participation in the invasion in part to set the stage for an international occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, said British officials interviewed recently. London was aware that the State Department had studied how to deal with an invasion's aftermath. But the British government was "shocked," in the words of one official, "when we discovered that in the postwar period the Defense Department would still be running the show."

The Downing Street Memo has been the subject of debate since the London Sunday Times first published it May 1. Opponents of the war say it proved the Bush administration was determined to invade months before the president said he made that decision.

Neither Bush nor Blair has publicly challenged the authenticity of the July 23 memo, nor has Dearlove spoken publicly about it. One British diplomat said there are different interpretations.

Last week, it was the subject of questions posed to Blair and Bush during the former's visit to Washington.

Asked about Dearlove being quoted as saying that in the United States, intelligence was being "fixed around the policy" of removing Hussein by military action, Blair said, "No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all." He then went on to discuss the British plan, outlined in the memo, to go to the United Nations to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq.

Bush said he had read "characterizations of the memo," pointing out that it was released in the middle of Blair's reelection campaign, and that the United States and Britain went to the United Nations to exhaust diplomatic options before the invasion.

U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges

By Dan Eggen and Julie Tate The Washington Post Sunday 12 June 2005
US often depends on lesser charges.

First of Two Parts

On Thursday, President Bush stepped to a lectern at the Ohio State Highway Patrol Academy in Columbus to urge renewal of the USA Patriot Act and to boast of the government's success in prosecuting terrorists.

Flanked by Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Bush said that "federal terrorism investigations have resulted in charges against more than 400 suspects, and more than half of those charged have been convicted."

Those statistics have been used repeatedly by Bush and other administration officials, including Gonzales and his predecessor, John D. Ashcroft, to characterize the government's efforts against terrorism.

But the numbers are misleading at best.

An analysis of the Justice Department's list of terrorism prosecutions by The Washington Post shows that 39 people - not 200 - have been convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security.

Most of the others were convicted of relatively minor crimes such as making false statements and violating immigration law - and had nothing to do with terrorism, the analysis shows. Overall, the median sentence was just 11 months.

Taken as a whole, the data indicate that identifying terrorists in the United States has been less successful than the government has often suggested. The statistics provide little support for the suggestion that authorities have discovered and prosecuted hundreds of terrorists. Except for a small number of well-known cases - such as truck driver Iyman Faris, who sought to take down the Brooklyn Bridge - few appear to have been involved in active plots against the United States.

In fact, among all the people charged as a result of terrorism investigations in the three years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, The Post found no demonstrated connection to terrorism or terrorist groups for 180 of them.

Just one in nine individuals on the list had an alleged connection to the al Qaeda terrorist network and only 14 people convicted of terrorism-related crimes - including Faris and convicted Sept. 11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui - have clear links to the group. Many more cases involve Colombian drug cartels, supporters of the Palestinian cause, Rwandan war criminals or others with no apparent ties to al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin Laden.

Many people appear to have been swept into US counterterrorism investigations by chance - through anonymous tips, suspicious circumstances or bad luck - and have remained classified as terrorism defendants years after being cleared of connections to extremist groups.

For example, the prosecution of 20 men, most of them Iraqis, in a Pennsylvania truck-licensing scam accounts for about 10 percent of individuals convicted - even though the entire group was publicly absolved of ties to terrorism in 2001.

"For so many of these cases, there seems to be much less substance to them than we first assume or have first been told," said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert who heads the Washington office of Rand Corp., a think tank that conducts national security research. "There's an inherent deterrent effect in cracking down on any illicit activity. But the challenge is not exaggerating what they were up to - not portraying them as super-terrorists when they're really the low end of the food chain."

Justice Department officials say they have not sought to exaggerate the importance or suspected associations of those prosecuted in connection with terrorism probes, and they argue that the list provides only a partial view of their efforts.

Officials said all the individuals were first put on the list because of a suspected connection or allegation related to terrorism. Last week, they also said that the department had tightened the requirements for including a case on the terrorism list.

Barry M. Sabin, chief of the department's counterterrorism section, said prosecutors frequently turn to lesser charges when they are not confident that they can prove crimes such as committing or supporting terrorism. Many defendants also have been prosecuted for relatively minor crimes in exchange for information that is not public but has proven valuable in other terrorism probes, he said.

"A person could not have been put on this list if there was not a concern about national security, at least initially," he said. "Are all these people an ongoing threat presently? Arguably not... . We are not trying to overstate or understate what we're doing. You don't want to put language or a label on people that is inconsistent with what they have done." The Numbers

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the Justice Department database has served as the key source of statistics on the status of terrorism investigations in the United States and has been cited frequently in official speeches and testimony to Congress. But since releasing a limited version in late 2001 with fewer than 100 names on it, the department has declined to provide further details.

The list obtained by The Post includes 361 cases defined as terrorism investigations by the department's criminal division from Sept. 11, 2001, through late September 2004. Thirty-one entries could not be evaluated because they were sealed and blacked out. (The list does not include about 40 cases filed since then, that account for Bush's total of about 400). The Post sought to update and correct data whenever possible, including noting convictions or sentences handed down within the past nine months.

The list of domestic prosecutions does not include terrorism suspects held at the Guantánamo Bay military prison or at secret locations around the globe. Nor does it include many of the approximately 50 people the Justice Department has acknowledged detaining as "material witnesses," or three men who were held in a South Carolina brig.

The Post identified 180 cases in which no connection to al Qaeda or another terrorist group could be found in court records, official statements, the 9/11 Commission Report or news accounts. Even some of the other cases featured early allegations of terrorist connections that were dropped.

Of the more than 200 individuals convicted, 19 included a crime related to terrorism or national security. More than a dozen defendants were acquitted or had their charges dismissed, including three Moroccan men in Detroit whose convictions were tossed out in September after the Justice Department admitted prosecutorial misconduct.

Not surprisingly, minor crimes produced modest punishments. The median sentence was 11 months, and nearly three dozen other defendants were given probation or deported. The most common convictions were on charges of fraud, making false statements, passport violations and conspiracy.

Two life sentences have been handed down so far: to Richard Reid, the British drifter who was foiled by passengers in his attempt to blow up an aircraft over the Atlantic Ocean; and Masoud Khan, a Maryland man convicted of traveling to Pakistan and seeking to fight with the Taliban against US forces. Two others convicted of terrorism-related crimes face life sentences: Abdel Sattar, an Egyptian-born postal worker convicted of conspiring to kill and kidnap in a foreign country; and Ali Timimi, a Northern Virginia spiritual leader convicted of encouraging others to attend terrorist camps. (Timimi was indicted in late September and was not on the list obtained by The Post.)

Only 14 of those convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security have clear links to bin Laden's network, most notably Moussaoui and Reid. Others include Faris, an admitted member of al Qaeda who sought to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, and six Yemeni men from Lackawanna, N.Y., who were convicted of providing material support for terrorists by attending an al Qaeda training camp before Sept. 11.

In addition, Taliban fighter John Walker Lindh, who is most closely associated with Afghanistan's deposed government, trained at an al Qaeda camp.

The patterns discovered by The Post are similar to findings in studies of Justice Department terrorism cases by New York University and Syracuse University, each of which examined different sets of data.

More than a third of the cases on the list arose from a post-Sept. 11 FBI dragnet, which resulted in the arrests of hundreds of Muslim immigrants for minor violations unrelated to the hijackings or terrorism.

"What we're seeing over time is the equivalent of mission creep: cases that would not be terrorism cases before Sept. 11 are swept onto the terrorism docket," said Juliette Kayyem, a former Clinton administration Justice official who heads the national security program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. "The problem is that it's not good to cook the numbers... . We have no accurate assessment of whether the war on terrorism is actually working." Tracking Al Qaeda

In the years before the Sept. 11 attacks, many veteran US counterterrorism officials assumed that al Qaeda sleeper cells were hiding in the country, awaiting orders to launch attacks. The strikes - carried out by 19 hijackers who arrived in the United States and trained here undetected - prompted an aggressive campaign by the Justice Department, the FBI and other agencies to identify al Qaeda operatives on US soil.

The results from the Justice Department database, however, raise the possibility that the presence of al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers within the United States is either limited or largely undetected, many terrorism experts say. In a recent assessment of al Qaeda's presence in the United States, for example, the FBI and CIA conceded that US authorities had not identified any operational sleeper cells akin to those unearthed over the past year in Britain, according to officials with access to the document.

"These kind of statistics show that we really don't know if they exist here in any significant way," said Martha Crenshaw, a professor of government at Wesleyan University in Connecticut who has studied terrorism since the late 1960s. "It's possible that they could have sleepers planted here for a long time and we could always be very surprised. But I'd say that's less likely compared with them trying to repeat a 9/11-style infiltration from the outside."

Other experts and government officials say the relatively small number of domestic terrorism prosecutions is partly the result of the administration's strategy to handle some of its most dangerous terrorism suspects - such as Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed - outside US courts.

As a result, only a limited number of potentially significant cases have been pursued publicly in US courts.

"After 9/11, they shifted focus from prosecution to prevention. That would mean that they are seeking to have their greatest effect by arresting, disrupting and detaining those who they believe have ties to terrorist activities," said Douglas W. Kmiec, a former Justice Department official who teaches law at Pepperdine University.

Viet D. Dinh, a Georgetown law professor who headed the Office of Legal Policy at Justice before and after the attacks, said the primary strategy is to use "prosecutorial discretion" by charging suspicious individuals with minor crimes as a way to detain them.

"You're talking about a violation of law that may or may not rise to the level of what might usually be called a federal case," Dinh said, referring to credit-card fraud, document violations and other offenses. "But the calculation does not happen in isolation; you are not just talking about the crime itself, but the suspicion of terrorism... . That skews the calculation in favor of prosecution."

Bush administration officials have frequently compared the strategy to the anti-Mafia campaign by former attorney general Robert F. Kennedy, who vowed to prosecute mobsters for crimes as minor as spitting on a sidewalk. But many defense lawyers and civil liberties advocates argue that the Mafia analogy is misplaced.

David Z. Nevin represented Idaho graduate student Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a Saudi national who was acquitted of federal terrorism charges in a closely watched trial last summer but agreed to be deported rather than fight immigration charges. Nevin said there are key differences between current counterterrorism cases and the prosecutions of gangsters such as Al Capone, who was famously convicted of tax evasion to get him off the street. "Everybody knew that Al Capone was committing murders and was doing all sorts of things. They just couldn't convict him," Nevin said.

"That's fine if you take it as a given that you have the devil here," he continued. "The problem is that you end up with people like Sami Al-Hussayen... . Whenever you live in that realm, you're going to make mistakes and you're going to hurt innocent people." Using One Case to Build Another

In the end, most cases on the Justice Department list turned out to have no connection to terrorism at all.

They involve such people as Hassan Nasrallah, a Dearborn, Mich., man convicted of credit-card fraud who happens to have the same name as the leader of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite group also known as the Party of God. Abdul Farid of High Point, N.C., was arrested on a false tip that he was sending money to the Taliban and was later deported after admitting he lied on a loan application. Moeen Islam Butt, a Pakistani jewelry-kiosk employee in Pennsylvania, spent eight months in jail before being deported on marriage-fraud and immigration charges.

And there is the case of Francois Guagni, a French national who made the mistake of illegally crossing the Canadian border on Sept. 14, 2001, with box cutters in his possession. It turned out that Guagni used the knives in his job as a drywall installer. He was deported in March 2003 after pleading guilty to unlawfully entering the country.

"His case had nothing to do with terrorism, as far as I've ever been told," said Guagni's attorney, Christopher D. Smith.

Some of the cases, however, remain murky. The question of involvement in terrorism lingers even after formal allegations of such ties have been dropped.

Consider the case of Enaam Arnaout, director of the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation, who was indicted amid great fanfare in October 2002 for allegedly helping to funnel money and equipment to al Qaeda operatives on three continents. Ashcroft called the group a source of "terrorist blood money" that was used to "fund the work of evil." The charity was shut down.

Less than a year later, prosecutors dropped six of the seven charges against Arnaout, and he pleaded guilty to a single count of racketeering for funding fighters in Bosnia and Chechnya. During a sentencing hearing in August 2003, US District Judge Suzanne B. Conlon told prosecutors they had "failed to connect the dots" and said there was no evidence that Arnaout "identified with or supported" terrorism.

The administration views the case differently. Bush, in a speech Friday at the National Counterterrorism Center in Northern Virginia, said investigators had "helped close down a phony charity in Illinois that was channeling money to al Qaeda."

Sabin, the Justice Department's counterterrorism chief, said he could not discuss the specifics of most cases because of restrictions posed by ongoing criminal proceedings. But he said one case in particular illustrates the government's strategy: the conviction of Abdurahman Alamoudi, who admitted to taking $1 million from Libya and using it to pay conspirators in a scheme to kill Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

Alamoudi, who once worked with senior US officials as head of the American Muslim Council, has agreed to cooperate with federal investigators as part of a plea agreement. Sabin said the case is "a significant success story" that shows how prosecutors can use one case to help build others.

"We have been successful in obtaining information and fueling our intelligence gathering efforts with many of these cases," Sabin said.

Saturday, June 11, 2005

More in Congress Want Iraq Exit Strategy

By Susan Milligan The Boston Globe Saturday 11 June 2005
Unease grows as war backing falls.

Washington - Faced with plummeting public support for the war in Iraq, a growing number of members of Congress from both parties are reevaluating the reasons for the invasion and demanding the Bush administration produce a plan for withdrawing US troops.

A bipartisan group of House members is drafting a resolution that calls on the administration to present a strategy for getting the United States out of Iraq, reflecting an increasing restlessness about the war in a chamber that 2 1/2 years ago voted overwhelmingly to support the use of force in Iraq.

The House International Relations Committee on Thursday approved a similar proposal, 32 to 9, with strong bipartisan support. Sponsored by Representative Joseph Crowley, a New York Democrat who voted to authorize force in Iraq in 2002, the proposal represents the first time a congressional committee has moved to demand steps be taken so that US troops can start coming home.

More than 100 Democrats - including 11 who voted for the war resolution - have signed onto a letter to President Bush requesting an explanation of the so-called Downing Street memo, a British document that charges the administration planned to go to war even without hard evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction.

The proposed resolutions would not have the force of law, if approved by the House and Senate. But the actions reflect discontent among lawmakers in both parties who are hearing constituent complaints about the war's escalating body counts and uncertain end.

Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina, a conservative Republican who voted to authorize force, said his district is growing weary of a war that has cost the lives of more than 1,600 US troops and left more than 12,000 wounded.

"I'm hearing: 'How much do we have to do? We're giving blood. We're giving money. What is the final chapter for our involvement?' I think people are looking to the administration for an explanation, whether we have done all we can do," said Jones, whose district is home to 60,000 retired military personnel.

Jones said he felt misled by the administration on the reasons for the war because no weapons of mass destruction have been found. "If I knew [then] what I knew today, I would not have voted for the resolution," Jones said.

Representative Marty Meehan, a Lowell Democrat who also voted for the war resolution, said he and some Democratic colleagues are working with five to 10 House Republicans on a resolution calling for an exit strategy to ease the United States out of Iraq. He said he hoped to get the support of 25 or more Republicans, despite the fact that only six voted against the war resolution.

"The war is going terribly," Meehan said. "It's due to a lack of a plan to win the peace. Mistakes have been piling up."

The administration has consistently said that the military is making progress in Iraq, noting successes in rounding up insurgents. Representative Duncan Hunter, a California Republican who is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said he rejects the idea of forcing the administration to lay out a clear exit strategy because it "sends a message" that the United States is not committed to finishing the job in Iraq.

"There is an exit strategy, and it's the shoring up of the Iraqi guard and a military force capable of protecting Iraq and its people," he said. "That cannot be fitted to a precise calendar."

But other lawmakers who voted for the Iraq war said their constituents are getting restless. A Washington Post/ ABC poll this week showed support for the war dropping dramatically, with nearly two-thirds of Americans surveyed saying that the United States has gotten "bogged down" in Iraq, compared with 41 percent in August 2003.

Representative Harold Ford, a centrist Democrat who also voted for the war, said his constituents in military-friendly Tennessee are clamoring to have their loved ones in Iraq brought home, and are growing increasingly skeptical about the future of the mission there.

While they supported the war initially, Tennessee voters have begun to express "a lot of frustration" about the duration of the mission and the number of casualties, said Ford, who recently returned from a trip to Iraq. "The president has to start sharing with the American people how long we are going to be there."

Some Democrats want a definite timeline for withdrawing, while others continue to berate the administration and their own colleagues for backing an invasion antiwar lawmakers believe was based on faulty or exaggerated intelligence.

Many Republicans are reluctant to criticize the president, while some Democrats who voted for the war are nervous about being lumped together with two of their party's most prominent antiwar figures - House minority leader Nancy Pelosi of California and Democratic National Committee chairman Howard Dean.

"Many of the Democrats who voted for the resolution authorizing the use of force do not want to be perceived as weak on national security, and those who voted against the resolution somehow think it's someone else's problem," Meehan said.

Still, despite lingering differences over the decision to go to war, a consensus has been growing among lawmakers in both parties - and on both sides of the war resolution - that the United States is in danger of getting mired in a protracted, costly conflict, Crowley said.

"I think the amendment sends a clear message that both sides, for the first time, are saying the situation in Iraq is not OK," Crowley said of the International Relations Committee's resolution, which drew support from 13 Republicans and 19 Democrats. "What I'm trying to do is create an umbrella we can all get under."

Monday, June 06, 2005

See the Statistics - Write Your Congressman Today!! You can help stop this war!! Bring our Soliders Home!!!!

Write your congressman - it takes seconds - do it daily!

Click here for the quickest way to contact your congressman! Please don't pass this opportunity by to save lives of our children, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, family and friends.

The Human Cost of Occupation - Over 35,000 WOUNDED - and 1672 Deaths since 3/19/03

Honor the Fallen - See the faces of those who have died in the War Against Terriorism!

U.S. & Coalition/Casualties - As of June 6th 2005- There have been 1,854 coalition troop deaths, 1,670 Americans, 89 Britons...

Pentagon in blinders -- Long before 9/11, the military was warned about low-tech warfare, but it didn't listen

by Stephen J. Hedges The Chicago Tribune Monday 06 June 2005

Long before 9/11, the military was warned about low-tech warfare, but it didn't listen.


Washington - Nearly 16 years ago, a group of four military officers and a civilian predicted the rise of terrorism and anti-American insurgencies with chilling accuracy.


The group said U.S. military technology was so advanced that foreign forces would be unlikely to challenge it directly, and it forecast that future foes would be non-state insurgents and terrorists whose weapons would be suicide car bombs, not precision-guided weapons.


"Today, the United States is spending $500 million apiece for stealth bombers," the group wrote in a 1989 article that appeared in a professional military journal. "A terrorist stealth bomber is a car with a bomb in the trunk--a car that looks like every other car."


The five men dubbed their theory "Fourth Generation Warfare" and warned that the U.S. military had to adapt. In the years since, the original group of officers, joined by a growing number of officers and scholars within the military, has pressed Pentagon leaders to acknowledge this emerging threat.
But rather than adopting a new strategy, the generals and civilian leaders in the Defense Department have continued to support conventional, high-intensity conflict and the expensive weapons that go with it. That is happening, critics say, despite lethal insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.


"They don't understand this kind of warfare," said Greg Wilcox, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Vietnam veteran and critic of Pentagon policies. "They want to return to war as they envision it. That's not going to happen."


Wilcox is just one of a number of maverick officers, active and retired, who have been agitating for change. Others include Marine Col. T.X. Hammes, whose recent book on the subject is required reading in some units, as well as Marine Col. G.I. Wilson, currently serving in Iraq, and H. John Poole, a retired Marine who has written extensively on insurgencies.


Together they make up the public face of a much larger debate within the U.S. military over whether the Defense Department is doing enough to train troops to fight insurgents.


It is a debate with enormous consequences. Though most of the more than 1,350 American combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan have been caused by low-tech insurgent weaponry such as roadside bombs, the Army plans to spend more than $120 billion in the next decade on a future combat system of digitally linked vehicles, weapons and unmanned aircraft. It is based largely on conventional warfare theory.


The Army also is reorganizing its 10 divisions into 43 more flexible, 5,000-soldier brigades that can be plunked down in a war zone. But the weapons and training those forces receive still will lean heavily toward the traditional view of conflict, with heavy tanks, helicopters, close air support and terrain-holding troops.


Soldiers Take Initiative
The mavericks' Fourth Generation Warfare theory is about as far as one can get from current Pentagon doctrine. But many of the captains, corporals and privates fighting today have adopted the mavericks' theories and tactics.


"So much of it was validated that it's theoretically right on the money," said Jim Roussell, a chief warrant officer in the Marine Reserves who focuses on gang crime in Chicago as a sergeant in the city's Police Department. He recently returned from Iraq after leading a Marine unit against insurgents.


Army and Marine Corps officials in Washington declined to answer questions on the changes suggested by the mavericks.


But in November, the Army issued a revised field manual on fighting insurgencies that had not been updated in more than a decade. It has received a mixed reception.


"We really have a lot of institutional friction right now," said Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, the Army manual's primary author. "There are a number of junior officers who understand this." Senior officers, Horvath said, have been less accepting.


Still, some units are adapting. The Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, for instance, last month began its second tour of Iraq after months of innovative training, including a requirement that all officers and soldiers receive basic Arabic language and culture training.


"It's working," said Col. H.R. McMaster, the regiment's commander, who has lectured at U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., and written a book about the failures of the Vietnam War. "It's a hard problem. Nothing is easy over here. But I'm telling you we're getting after it, we're pursuing the enemy, we are totally on the offensive right now."


Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's office has given irregular warfare a "higher priority" in the upcoming 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, according to an excerpt of the document. But the report will not be completed until next year. Real war, the mavericks point out, is happening now.
Chinese war philosopher "Sun Tzu had it right," said one Army lieutenant colonel who spent a year fighting insurgents in Iraq and who requested anonymity. "If you know your enemy and if you know yourself, you'll never lose. We know about half of what we should about the enemy, and we don't know ourselves. We can't figure out what kind of Army we want to be."


The 1989 article that broached the rise of terrorism and insurgencies sprang from a group of officers who met regularly to discuss tactics and strategy. The group gathered in the Alexandria, Va., home of William Lind, a military analyst and former Senate aide who is director of the Free Congress Foundation's Center for Cultural Conservatism.


Lind already had written about the first three generations of modern warfare: Napoleonic-style lines of battle, World War I trench conflict and the swift-moving "maneuver" warfare that the German army displayed in World War II. In the 1980s, the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its official doctrine.


What, the group wondered, would be the next generation of war?


The group -- Lind, Wilson, John Schmitt of the Marines, and Keith Nightengale and Joseph Sutton of the Army -- put its collective answer in a short article in the October 1989 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. As the Soviet Union faltered, they wrote, new insurgencies and terrorist groups could erupt in countries with an "Islamic or Asiatic tradition."


"Mass, of men or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor," they wrote. "In fact, mass may become a disadvantage, as it will be easy to target. Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate."


The article marked a radical departure from military thinking. Until then, the word "insurgency" had been virtually banned inside the Pentagon.


In his 1986 book, "The Army and Vietnam," military analyst and Army veteran Andrew Krepinevich details just how reviled a fight against insurgents is among U.S. military leaders. Top Army commanders in Washington, Krepinevich found, brushed aside orders from President John Kennedy in the early 1960s to build a counterinsurgent capability in Vietnam.


And after the war, he said, counterinsurgency theory was purged from the Pentagon. Instead, the military returned to preparing for a conventional war with the Soviet Union.


"In a way, the lesson of Vietnam for the American people and the Army was `No more Vietnams,'" Krepinevich said. "Vietnam was a searing personal experience for the Army, incredibly negative."
After the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the mavericks argued that it was less a victory than it appeared. The war was "a throwback to World War II in Europe with updated weapons," they wrote in a 1994 Marine Corps Gazette article. U.S. claims of success, they suggested, masked the vulnerabilities of lumbering, heavy armor, a notion borne out in 1993 during the U.S. military's misadventure in Somalia.
The Pentagon, though, continued to equip for battlefield warfare, encouraged by a Congress that was more than willing to back big weapons, ships and aircraft programs and the jobs they create.
"There's no money in counterinsurgency," said Hammes, the Marine colonel, who served in Iraq and whose recent book, "The Sling and the Stone," has stirred more debate within the military. "It's about language skills. It's about people. It's about a lot of soft money moving over to [the Departments of] State, Commerce, Treasury, and there's no F-22 [fighter jet] in this program."


A 9/11 Realization
On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, Schmitt, a former Marine and a co-author of the 1989 article, was at O'Hare International Airport on his way to Pittsburgh. Minutes before boarding his flight, he saw a television report that an airliner had hit New York's World Trade Center. He kept watching as the second plane hit.


"I was thinking, `We're at war here,'" said Schmitt, a military consultant based in Champaign, Ill. "This is the new warfare."


The Sept. 11 attacks, Schmitt and others hoped, would bring change within the Pentagon. Even an Al Qaeda terrorist Web site referred to the 1989 article, noting that "some American military experts predict a fundamental change in the future form of warfare" and that "this new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war machine."


But little changed. The U.S. forces that flowed into Afghanistan in late 2001 and into Iraq in March 2003 were largely conventional.


The U.S. military quickly toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. But after those successes, both the Afghan extremists and Hussein's sympathizers transformed into effective insurgencies.


The mavericks contend that the U.S. response has been a string of classic military mistakes, especially in Iraq.


U.S. forces took over Hussein's palaces and military bases, secluding themselves from ordinary Iraqis and cutting off lines of intelligence. Thousands of innocent Iraqis were wrongfully imprisoned in a ham-handed search for insurgents, breeding contempt for the American occupiers.


Training to fight insurgents lagged. Emphasis instead was put on finding technical solutions--another echo of Vietnam. They include devices that detect roadside explosives placed by insurgents, surveillance drones and the belated armoring of vehicles, which so far has cost more than $600 million.


"Here's an army that went into Iraq in 2003 with exactly the same set of equipment it had in 1991, with very few modifications," said Douglas Macgregor, a tank commander in the first Iraq war who wrote several books about reforming the Army before retiring as a colonel a year ago. "It hasn't produced anything new at all in 20 years."


Still, the mavericks argue that, even today, changes could have an impact on the way soldiers are fighting.


First, the mavericks call for ground forces to reorganize into distinct, small units--not large, lumbering divisions or expeditionary forces--that will live among Iraqis.


"Why are we still riding around in Humvees?" asks Poole, the retired Marine, whose Posterity Press has published books on counterinsurgent tactics. "In a war like this, you've got to get off the vehicle and into the neighborhood."


Second, more needs to be done to give soldiers language and cultural training, they say, something that officers in the Army and Marine Corps say has recently begun.


A third reform would prescribe a more judicious use of powerful weapons, such as tank rounds and 2,000-pound precision aerial bombs, especially in cities. Insurgencies exploit the deaths of civilians, the mavericks argue.


They say that the most important change would be a new command system, one that bases promotions on initiative rather than obedience and encourages taking risks, recognizing that mistakes will happen.


"One of the things we found in our experiments was the idea of strategic corporals," said Roussell, the Marine reservist and Chicago policeman. "The corporals are capable of doing it. We just need to empower them."


The military has taken some small steps toward change, and it is promising more.


Other units are following the lead of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and offering more language and cultural training, as well as a review of tactics.


Units rotating to Iraq now get several weeks of specialized training at the Army's two national training centers; tactics simulate life among Iraqis, including the use of Iraqi-American role players.
Additional focus has been put on running road checkpoints, detecting roadside explosives and protecting convoys.


But those efforts give new troops just a brief taste of the challenges they will be facing, and they put a heavy emphasis on defensive measures. According to officers who have been involved in counterinsurgent operations, there still is a reluctance among top commanders to acknowledge the nature of the enemy and what skills American soldiers need to fight.


"There's definitely the sensation that the Army's holding its breath," said one officer who recently took command of deploying forces, "that this will all blow over, and they can go back to what they want to do."


Changes in the Field
At the same time, said the officer, who requested anonymity, younger officers with command of fighting units are making the changes they need to, whether the Pentagon approves or not.
"There's a way the institution does things," he said, "and then there's the way that things are actually done."


Receiving little notice inside the Pentagon, the maverick officers have continued to post their theories, criticisms and extensive PowerPoint briefings on unofficial military Web sites.
One notable article last year, written by Marine Col. Wilson, was titled "Iraq--Fourth Generation Warfare Swamp." The Marines denied permission for Wilson, who is in Iraq, to be interviewed for this article.


Although they differ on the particulars of changing the military, the mavericks agree that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and Iraq has been a lost opportunity. At best, they say, the outcome of both conflicts is uncertain. Some say they are doomed.


"There's nothing that you can do in Iraq today that will work," said Lind, one of the original Fourth Generation Warfare authors. "That situation is irretrievably lost."

Saturday, June 04, 2005

Despite Years of U.S. Pressure, Taliban Fight On in Jagged Hills -- The intensity of the fighting in remote corners of Afghanistan reveals the Taliban


Despite Years of U.S. Pressure, Taliban Fight On in Jagged Hills -- The intensity of the fighting in remote corners of Afghanistan reveals the Taliban to be still a well-supplied fighting force.


By Carlotta Gall The New York Times Saturday 04 June 2005

Gazek Kula, Afghanistan - For weeks, sightings of Taliban fighters were being reported all over the rugged mountains here. But when Staff Sgt. Patrick Brannan and his team of scouts drove into a nearby village to investigate a complaint of a beating, they had no idea that they were stumbling into the biggest battle of their lives.


On May 3, joined by 10 local policemen and an interpreter, the scouts turned up at a kind of Taliban convention - of some 60 to 80 fighters - and were greeted by rockets and gunfire. The sergeant called for reinforcements and was told to keep the Taliban engaged until they arrived. "I've only got six men," he remembers saying.


For the next two and a half hours, he and his small squad, who had a year of experience in Iraq, cut off a Taliban escape. Nearly 40 Taliban and one Afghan policeman were killed. "It's not supposed to be like that here," said Capt. Mike Adamski, a battalion intelligence officer. "It's the hardest fight I saw, even after Iraq."


During the last six months, American and Afghan officials have predicted the collapse of the Taliban, the hard-line Islamists thrown out of power by American forces in 2001, citing their failure to disrupt the presidential election last October and a lack of activity last winter.
But the intensity of the fighting here in Zabul Province, and in parts of adjoining Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces - roughly 100 square miles of mountain valleys in all - reveals the Taliban to be still a vibrant fighting force supplied with money, men and weapons.


The May 3 battle was part of an almost forgotten war in the most remote corners of Afghanistan, a strange and dangerous campaign that is part cat-and-mouse game against Taliban forces and part public relations blitz to win over wary villagers still largely sympathetic to the Taliban.


An Afghan informer, who did not want his name used for fear of retribution, has told American forces that the Taliban ranks have been rapidly replenished by recruits who slipped in from Pakistan. For every one of the Taliban killed on May 3, judging by his account, another has arrived to take his place.


With a ready source of men, and apparently plentiful weapons, the Taliban may not be able to hold ground, but they can continue their insurgency indefinitely, attacking the fledgling Afghan government, scaring away aid groups and leaving the province ungovernable, some Afghan and American officials say.


Still, the former commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, described the insurgency as in decline in an interview on April 26 and predicted that a government amnesty offer would fatally split the Taliban in coming months.


In April and May, in a new push to flush out and end the insurgency, American forces began probing the final bastions of Taliban control in this unforgiving landscape. They have succeeded in provoking some of the heaviest combat in Afghanistan in the last three years, killing more than 60 Taliban fighters in April and May, by one United States military estimate.


After a winter lull, the Second Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry, which arrived at the Lagman base in Zabul from its base in Vicenza, Italy, found its new post hopping with activity, Capt. Jonathan Hopkins, the battalion adjutant, and others said.


Suspected Taliban fighters burned the district headquarters in Khak-e-Iran in mid-March. An American platoon was ambushed in the Deychopan district on April 15. United States Special Forces were in a sizable fight in the Argandab district on April 18, killing eight men suspected of being Taliban and capturing a mid-level commander. Two Taliban commanders led attacks on the police station at Saigaz, the seat of the Argandab district, on April 21 and 22.


"There are three to four healthy cells, with 30 to 60 fighters in each; that's 120 to 240 people altogether," said Captain Adamski, estimating the total Taliban strength in the area, though accounts from local people indicated higher numbers.


In the battle on May 3, the 60 to 80 Taliban fighters encountered by Sergeant Brannan and his scouts were well armed and well prepared, with weapons caches and foxholes dotting an orchard where the heaviest fighting took place.


The Taliban fought to within 150 yards of American positions and later hit one of two armored Humvees with a volley of rocket-propelled grenades that set it on fire, Sergeant Brannan said. Specialist Joseph Leatham, in the turret, kept firing as the vehicle burned, allowing his comrades to get out alive.


When the first American helicopter arrived as reinforcement, it came under fire and was forced to veer away. "I had one magazine left," Sergeant Brannan said. "I had enough for another 15 to 20 minutes."


In all, the battle lasted seven hours. Ten Taliban fighters were captured, and five Afghan policemen and six American soldiers were wounded.


The Afghan informer, who walked for three hours to see the American troops when he heard in late May that they were in Gazek Kula, said that a local Taliban commander, Mullah Abdullah, had led the Taliban in the fight. The mullah escaped with his deputy, Sangaryar, by jumping in the river and floating downstream, the informer said.


After the battle, he said, the Taliban sent out word that local men should help bury the dead. Mullah Abdullah and his deputy were there as they buried 19 bodies, 14 of them representing the commander's entire fighting unit.


But news of the fight traveled fast, and dozens more fighters crossed from Pakistan to shore up the Taliban ranks, the informer said. Mullah Abdullah now had a new force of 40 men.
Three other leading Taliban commanders in the province - Mullah Muhammad Alam, Mullah Ahmadullah and Mullah Hedayatullah - had more than 200 fighters between them, with more reserves in Pakistan, he said.


The informer said that he knew Mullah Abdullah well and that the mullah had been a guest in his house. But in late April the mullah and his men detained him, accusing him of spying for the Americans. They seized his satellite phone and rifle and threatened to kill him, but let him go because of shared tribal links.


Sgt. First Class Kyle Shuttlesworth, 45, a veteran soldier who is counting the days to retirement, said that the American forces here had tracked many men infiltrating from Pakistan, but that since they crossed unarmed, the Americans had no cause to detain them. "We are trying to work out where they get their weapons," he said.


Some in the area accused Pakistan of fueling the insurgency. Though ostensibly an American ally, Pakistan is viewed with suspicion here by some American military and Afghan officials for its failure to stem the flow of Taliban recruits.


"The Taliban will be finished when there is no foreign interference," said Mullah Zafar Khan, the Deychopan district chief. He blamed mullahs and others in Pakistan for inveigling young people into join the fight. "Pakistan is giving them the wrong information and telling them to go and do jihad," he said.


The governor of the province, Delbar Jan Arman, said the answer was to unite the local tribes and strengthen the government, since the Taliban were profiting from a power vacuum. "The reason is not that the Taliban are strong," he said. "The government is not so strong in these areas."


Sergeant Shuttlesworth said part of the American strategy was to engage the local people. Distributing aid and providing jobs in reconstruction projects were paying dividends in the next district, he said, with many people coming forward to offer intelligence on the Taliban.
The soldiers have to learn to switch from aggression to friendliness, he said, "like turning off and on a light switch." It is a slow and tricky job. At Gazek Kula, the American forces at first encountered a wary, silent population that shut itself indoors and turned out the lights.


After bunking in a deserted farmhouse, Sergeant Shuttlesworth and the unit's commander, First Lt. Joshua Hyland, still pale from his recent desk job, chatted with villagers for hours the next day in the small bazaar, joking with children, who at first would not accept even a cookie.
"The Taliban are not here, so there will be no fighting," Sergeant Shuttlesworth told the villagers. "We are here to talk to the people, see if you have enough food, if the children are healthy. We are here for a few days, not to harass the people."


The villagers said the Taliban passed through every so often and demanded food. "The Taliban come only for one night," Wali Muhammad, 33, a wheat trader, said. "They are not a security problem."


Others complained that the Taliban had gathered them in the bazaar and warned them not to run a school, support the government or accept foreign aid. The children said the Taliban had warned them that school would turn them into infidels.


"Twenty days ago there were 10 Taliban in this room," a former policeman, Abdul Matin, 40, told the Americans sitting on the floor over a glass of tea in his home.


They came in a group of 100, he said, and spread out around the village. They had satellite phones and plenty of money, offering one man $2,000 to work is an informer. They were gone before dawn and have not been back since, Mr. Matin said.


"The people support the Taliban because they don't loot and they respect the women," he said. But he added, "The whole district wants to help the Americans, because our country is destroyed."


Lieutenant Hyland urged the villagers to vote in the parliamentary elections scheduled for Sept. 18 and elect someone honest. "Power for the people comes through democracy," he said. "It has to start with the strength of the people, even if it is dangerous for you."


American units have encountered Taliban every few days since the May 3 battle, Sergeant Shuttlesworth said. The battalion suffered its first fatality on May 21, when Pfc. Steven C. Tucker, 19, of Grapevine, Tex., was killed by a roadside explosion in the south. It is there that insurgents cross on their way from Pakistan to join up with the Taliban in the mountains.
The American forces keep probing, hoping to lure the Taliban out of the craggy mountain passes. On a recent five-hour trek, Sergeant Shuttlesworth took his men, along with 10 local police officers, down the narrow river valley near here, trying once again to tempt the Taliban into revealing themselves.


"We are the bait," he told the local police chief. "Are you ready to fight?"

Friday, June 03, 2005

Joe Galloway: Now's the Time for a Clear-Eyed Look at Where We Are in Iraq

June 3, 2005

WASHINGTON - In a Memorial Day interview, Vice President Dick Cheney told Larry King that the Iraqi insurgency is in its death throes, Osama bin Laden "is on the run," we've dealt a major blow to al-Qaida and the terror suspects detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have been "treated humanely and decently."


Wait a minute. What did he say? That sounded suspiciously like a "light at the end of the tunnel" speech.


President Bush echoed his No. 2's conclusions the next day, declaring that the upsurge in violence in Iraq is evidence that the insurgency is on its last legs.


We haven't heard the like since July 3, 2003, when the president told those misguided souls who thought they saw an opportunity to kill Americans in Iraq: "Bring 'em on!"


Since the last good news in Iraq, the Jan. 30 elections, and a resulting but brief pause in the pace of attacks on Americans and Iraqis, more than 700 Iraqis have been slaughtered in a wave of terrorist bombings and attacks that are increasing in sophistication and viciousness. The death toll among American troops in Iraq is 1,665 and rising.


Rising while the president is "staying the course" and Dick Cheney still believes that Saddam Hussein was in cahoots with bin Laden, on the verge of building a nuclear weapon and preparing to unleash clouds of chemical and biological agents on the world in general and Americans in particular.

Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld marches stubbornly on with his crackpot ideas about how to transform the military so it's lighter, faster and more agile. So far, he's succeeding only in breaking the Army and the Marine Corps.


As Knight Ridder's Tom Lasseter reported this week, U.S. field commanders say we have so few troops along the Syrian border that the area has remained wide open for the free transit of Holy War folks from all over the Muslim world who come to drive cars packed with explosives to kill themselves and fellow Muslims in the name of God.


We arrived in Iraq more than two years ago knowing that more than a million tons of bombs, artillery shells, land mines, grenades, bullets, portable anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and AK-47 rifles were sitting in more than 600 ammunition dumps all over the country.


But because there aren't enough American troops on the ground, we've secured only about 25 percent of those ammo dumps. Some others have a frightened Iraqi security guard, armed with a rusty pistol, on the gate.


When a dump truck driven by heavily armed terrorists pulls up and they offer him a choice of a $100 bill or death, he waves them through. They load the dump truck with 500-pound bombs and 155 mm artillery shells to make the ubiquitous IEDs -- improvised explosive devices - that kill American soldiers and Iraqis the next day or the next week.


In pursuit of Rumsfeld's holy grail of fast and light, Army divisions have been ordered to leave home half or more of their tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Tank and artillery crews have been dismounted, turned into light infantry and sent out in light transport vehicles, Humvees, to patrol the deadliest roads and streets in the world.


They've paid the price, and they continue to pay it.


These fine young soldiers, many of them National Guardsmen and Reservists, get only six or nine or 12 months between combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most are on their second or third time around.


There's an answer to this, if our intention is to stay in Iraq as long as it takes: Increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps so the burden can be shared and lightened.

This Rumsfeld refuses to do, even as he watches the force begin to crack and recruitment fall 25 percent and more below target. In Army towns in Georgia and Texas and North Carolina, headhunters are holding well-attended seminars on the opportunities for young captains and majors who leave the service.


Private contractors offer veteran Special Forces sergeants and warrant officers $20,000 a month to do the same jobs they've been doing in Iraq for much less, and the backbone of the force is leaving in droves. The Army offers a re-enlistment bonus of $197,000 -- about what a senior enlisted soldier can make in 10 months with a private contractor -- to some of the same people in an effort to keep them.


This would be a good time to conduct a thoughtful review of where we are in this war, where we're going, what our exit strategy should be and what can be done to prevent a Vietnam-style disaster in the Middle East.


The answer isn't staying the course, if the course we're on points us in the wrong direction.

The answer isn't the false optimism of those who argue that more insurgent attacks are proof that the insurgency is dying, or that Iraqi boys will soon be doing what until now American men and women have had to do for them.

Their military and civilian superiors owe our soldiers -- and all of us -- more than political spin. They, and we, deserve realism and the truth.

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